[DAO Discussion] Community Proposal: Enhanced Migration Incentives for wMEMO to VOLTA Conversion
Objective:
Introduce a dynamic incentive structure for the wMEMO to VOLTA migration, rewarding active participation and support in the migration proposal while offering a solution for previously ineligible or non-participating holders to re-engage with the migration process.
High Level Details:
The primary goal of this proposal is to facilitate a more inclusive and rewarding migration process from wMEMO to VOLTA, creating a win-win scenario for both active participants in the governance process and those who missed the initial migration deadline. The key feature of this proposal is the introduction of a tiered reward system for voters based on their support for the migration, alongside enabling a pathway for holders who have previously sold their wMEMO to re-engage.
Provide Low Level Details:
1. Incentivization Tier System:
Top Supporter Reward: The address that votes “Yes” with the highest amount of VOLTA, receives a 10% bonus in VOLTA tokens.
General Supporter Reward: All other addresses voting “Yes” collectively share a 2.5% bonus in VOLTA tokens. This bonus is distributed proportionally based on the size of each voter’s VOLTA tokens amount.
2. Migration Mechanics:
The exchange ratio will be maintained at 1 wMEMO to 330 VOLTA tokens.
3. Re-engagement Path for Previous Holders:
Holders who sold their wMEMO post-initial migration deadline but prior to the snapshot for this proposal are eligible to participate. They must reacquire an amount of wMEMO up to or equivalent to the holdings they had at the initial migration cut-off. Proof of original holdings and post-proposal acquisition must be verified through the submission of relevant blockchain transactions.
A grace period (e.g., 60 days from proposal acceptance) will be provided for such transactions to occur and be verified as such by opening a ticket on the Discord channel
4. Implementation Timeline and Process:
Immediately upon the proposal’s acceptance, the exchange threshold on snapshot.org will be recalculated to 0.5% of VOLTA’s circulating supply, enabling wider participation.
The smart contract or manual verification process, whichever is applicable, will be updated to reflect the tiered incentive structure and re-engagement pathway mechanics.
5. Safeguards and Exclusions:
Minimum Holding Period for Incentive Qualification: To ensure participation in the migration process aligns with the long-term interests of the VOLTA ecosystem, any wMEMO that is reacquired for the purpose of re-engagement in the migration must be retained for a specified period (e.g., 90 days) following the completion of the migration. This condition must be met for participants to qualify for any associated incentives. This safeguard is designed to deter speculative behavior by ensuring that participants who reacquire wMEMO for migration incentives are genuinely invested in the long-term viability of the protocol rather than short-term gains.
Exclusion for Non-Compliant Behaviors: Participants who attempt to circumvent the migration rules, engage in deceptive practices, or otherwise act in bad faith to exploit the migration process for undue advantage will be identified and excluded from receiving migration incentives. This includes, but is not limited to, attempts to manipulate eligibility through unethical means or providing false information during the verification process. Ensuring the integrity of the migration process is paramount, and as such, actions taken to unfairly benefit at the expense of the protocol and its community will be met with strict disqualification from incentive distributions.
6. Transparency and Reporting:
A detailed report will be published post-migration clarifying the distribution of incentives, including anonymized data on top supporters and the general bonus dispersion.
Continuous updates will be provided on the migration process and bonus distribution to ensure full transparency with the community.
Conclusion:
This proposal aims to reinvigorate the migration from wMEMO to VOLTA by introducing a tiered incentive system that rewards both significant and general support for the migration effort. By also providing a path for those who initially missed out to re-engage, this proposal seeks to strengthen the community and ensure a more inclusive, equitable process. The introduction of a more participatory governance model through reduced proposal thresholds on snapshot.org further exemplifies our commitment to a community-driven approach.
Hey! Thanks for the proposal, here are a few comments/questions.
Not sure how I feel about the incentives, but I guess it is one way to do it.
It would be interesting to know the potential for the increased in supply on that alone, not sure if you made any calculations around that ?
What do you mean by those terms: “VOLTA equivalent”, “as per their wMEMO holdings” ?
The people who votes would have to buy wMEMO to get the bonus ? Why would they do that ?
Also, why is the % based on their migrated amount ? All the VOLTA bought after the migration doesn’t count ?
Unsure what the idea is behind this ? Given that Snapshot takes a “snapshot” when starting a vote, we would be counting different holdings than the ones used for the vote for the incentives ?
Is 60 days the window for the new migration ?
I’m assuming the verification is made by the team ? If so, the wording makes it so a user could end up over the grace period because the team took X amount of time to do the verification. Should amend to something like “opening a ticket” or however the verification method is completed, similar to the wording in CMP 1.
Two two points are kind of contradicting each other it seems ? The first one says they need to hold wMEMO or have sold wMEMO before the snapshot, but the second point says.
Not sure why the snapshot minimum needs to be recalculated ? Anyone with any amount of Volta can vote so there would be no change in the potential participation.
By this do you mean that after the migration, they need to hold they Volta for 90 days ? How will that be enforced ?
Could you give an example ? Those points are pretty vague. Probably on purpose, but it complicates things when trying to implement a proposal properly.
The proposed incentive system could increase the total supply of VOLTA tokens due to the bonuses involved. The extent of this increase depends on the number of wMEMO holders participating and the amount migrated. Calculations would require data on current wMEMO holdings willing to migrate under this proposal.
Amending this part for clarity
Amending this part, with a revision
Amending the part to include “opening a ticket”, the 60-day grace period applies to previous holders that had sold their wMEMO to reacquire wMEMO up to to the amount their account had before they sold.
Similarly if one had held without selling, they would be automatically eligible within the 60-day grace period and not need to act within this period by restoring their holdings to their original state.
The mention of recalculating the snapshot minimum for posting proposals on Snapshot.org may have been misunderstood. This adjustment aims to lower the barrier for proposing changes in the governance process of VOLTA protocol by reducing the required holding from 1% to 0.5% of circulating supply, thereby encouraging broader community participation.
For wMEMO holders that migrate to VOLTA, the incentive qualification based on a 90-day holding period post-migration refers to maintaining their VOLTA holdings to qualify for incentives, this incentivizes in the long-term viability of the protocol rather then short-term gains.
Enforcement could be managed through smart contract conditions that lock the bonus/migrated VOLTA for the 90-day period, ensuring compliance.
An example report could include anonymized identifiers for participants, the amount of wMEMO migrated, the bonus VOLTA awarded, and timestamps for migration and incentive distribution. Regular updates might cover the number of completed migrations, the total volume of VOLTA distributed as bonuses, and any notable changes or decisions made during the process to enhance transparency.
The proposal addresses the issue of unbacked wMEMO stemming from the Multichain exploit by proposing a verification process for migration eligibility. This ensures only legitimately acquired wMEMO are considered valid for migration. Capping the total wMEMO eligible for migration to the original supply limit is indeed worth considering, as it directly prevents the dilution of value for existing token holders by avoiding the migration of illegitimately inflated supplies. This approach aligns with the goal of maintaining integrity and value within the ecosystem.
If you are a Volta holder, you by definition support the Volta ecosystem, while past Wmemo members may have not much meaning. One thing you have to ask yourself is this what you want as a Holder of Volta. In a sense, you are opening the possibility for vulnerability for your own Volta holdings by not supporting ones that were once like yourselves and a believer of the system.
Perhaps next time, there is a 60-90 day migration period, you miss the boat, and then by not standing with us now, you then are open to the possibility of such an outcome.
Consider us once again, and keep the ecosystem in strength and unity.
This way current Volta users gain something from the transition.
I am very much in favour of a mechanism like this allowing for locked out users to gain back their right of governance which is rightful due to ownership in the transitioned DAO (Wonderland).
It’s worth to note that 60% of users have been locked out in the transition.
The number is high enough that one could expect continued restlessness or risk of some sort of legal action otherwise.
The only other viable alternative would be splitting the Volta DAO into 2 DAOs thus separating current Vs locked out users, which is a lot more expensive to current Volta users since the value of the treasury > value of Volta.