I vote yes! Let’s do it!
Definitely Option A, let those who want to leave go so we can start fresh.
Clearly option A for me.
The Professors proposals at least get us to a “Road Map” for voting on shit.
Most of the proposals not coming from the professor are only breading more unanswered questions continuing the cycle.
Just my opinion though.
Dear Professor,
Can we add the following into the proposal. In CURVE protocol, people who stake longer in the protocol, get more rewards. For example, people who stake for 4 years, get the maximum rewards, which is. a 2.5x boost to their rewards. Can we add something similar here so that long term holders are rewarded more.
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With a more ‘cohesive’ voting road map in place, I believe tweaks to the ecosystem protocols such as JM1 has suggested will be very effective and obtainable.
Still NOT in favor of rage quit or buybacks. It only helps the whales to profit from arbitrage or those who bought at the dip. They are not long term holders and are only looking to profit from the buybacks. If we move to a revenue share model with more rewards for longterm stakers, this will incentivise people to stake longer and this will reduce selling pressure. This will automatically push the price up. At that stage people who want to quit can quit at a higher price.
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RageQuit will results in zero treasury.
If ragequitters can’t explain why they want a % of treasury instead of just selling …
since frogs beat whales in initial vote, whales are depositing small amounts of memo in hundreds of dummy wallets.
Whales won’t lose twice. I promise.
I vote for option C
Professeor all the way but no rage quit for anyone
Why would anyone rage quit at the bottom and drain our treasury?
Just people who want to hurt frog nation.
this is fairer to those who have held for longer, supported
bumping it up! btw did you guys realized even without doing anything, wmemo price has naturally went up hehe
I overall think option A is a good compromise.
I however don’t really understand how having an APY multiplier would increase the percentage of the treasury owned by those that stay.
So let’s consider a situation where trading is stopped, people who want out can quit and redeem their share of the treasury using some button on the website.
Let’s say someone decides to stay and owns 1 wMemo, which, (let’s take some hypothetical numbers here, for the sake of the exercise) is equal to 1% of the treasury.
If, after rage quit option, trading is still closed for 2 weeks, and APY is multiplied by 2, what’s the benefit to those holding ?
After two weeks, this person will still own 1wMemo (and more MEMO, but that’s pointless), and the same percentage of the treasury (maybe a little bit more, but that would be because of the $67 million BSGG not taken by rage quitters, not because of the APY), since quitters will have redeemed their share of the treasury and their wMemo will have been taken out of the circulation.
Am I missing something ? I don’t think increasing APY for holders would increase their share of the treasury.
What would would be airdropping them some wMemo, proportionally to the amount they own.
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Option A is the most sensible solution! Keeping our word for a firm rebuy, letting go of any angry investors who might come back later. Suspending trading and rewarding all investors with a multiplier is a really good solution. In the end a win-win situation for everyone!
I vote for A!
I voted A.
Not because I intend to rage quit myself: been holding since september, I traded defensively as it’s a new project, and as such have not experienced any losses.
Others are affected differently so I still think option A is the most healthy way forward keeping in mind a longer term perspective - it’s about keeping the integrity of the project intact.
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Option A, definitely
I am for rage quiting solution, however, trying to restrict liquidity / stop people from trading sounds like a disaster in the making (temple dao?).
As people pointed out above, not all liquidity in the pairs is owned by the protocol, more over, whales could set up their own pairs anyway. I can only see small frogs getting hurt more when liquidity dries up and volatility goes wild.
If we can’t restrict trading and price needs to return to at least backing, perhaps the rage quiting solution could accomplish that? If whales arbitrage this process, wouldn’t that return price to backing?
I get that transactions while the vote is still running can be gamed, but how do you solve that in a decentralized system?
Edit: What if ragequiters need to lock their wMEMO in a contract before vote.
if the vote passes, they get their stake of treasury. If vote fails, they get to claim back their wMEMO.
Would this address the arbitrage issue?
(didnt mean to create new post)
Our native price is inching up towards backing price. not sure we need a rage quit option if people can just cash out at a decent price. Or maybe we can just simply re-implement buybacks at backing. I like the professors proposal and support moving forward with his proposals and even hiring him. He seems like he’d be capable of pushing the details forward and making each step happen on time. We need someone like him along side Daniele. Hopefully they get along 
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Option A is what I would choose
Option A a good solution to help those like me who plan to stay
I think The Professor’s article was very insightful, so I would definitely agree to follow most of his guidelines. Would not consider offering him the position of Treasurer until he’s not doxxed to the entire community.
