gm!
We read through all the replies here, thanks for such an engaging discussion. We saw a few themes in the topics raised that we think are worthwhile addressing a little further:
â25% is too highâ
Thanks to @CryptoKeeper, @0xWicked, @dronezilla and many others for raising and discussing this.
When modelling compensation, we took two things into account:
1. What would be our potential earnings from different monetisation methods?
Different monetisation methods might include launching our own native token as a standalone product. Obviously, this has a very high financial upside for founders.
Working, legitimate products have market caps of hundreds of millions of dollars, and founder tokens can be worth a lot of money. We could be very aggressive with token rewards to attract TVL (launching a new token for liquid staking products is an advantage that existing token projects canât deploy as easily) and thus create a high valuation.
We could even raise money from suits if we wanted, since theyâre dying to put money into any projects right now.
However, we believe an over-dilution of token projects is not always a good thing for ecosystems and weâd instead prefer to contribute to create value in an existing community-owned ecosystem. We already are personal holders of both $TIME and $SPELL and believe accruing value to an existing DAO through a new liquid staking product is a better use of our time overall
2. What would be our potential earnings from the same monetisation method but with a different DAO?
The other big liquid staking DAO we could contribute to is Lido. Lidoâs existing precedent for revenue share is 20% â but they have larger token grants too. For example, Lido and Shard Labs agreed at a token grant of $12M at the time of posting, with a 20% revenue share for the building team that lasted indefinitely/forever â basically until they ceased to work on it.
We think front-loading a higher fee that drops to a lower fee after 4 years makes us almost in-line with the Lido compensation. We take less of an initial fee/token grant and a more front-loaded revenue share. Weâre happy to do it either way, but thought this one seemed fairer.
If governance prefers a flat 20% indefinitely, thatâs okay with us, but we thought reducing it over time was actually preferable since crypto assets generally increase in price over time and AVAX could be much more valuable in 4-5 years.
Using Lidoâs historic examples of compensation was a pretty useful way to propose, since instead of just suggesting numbers, we can see what would be market-level realistic comp at another DAO.
Why do we want to work with Wonderland over Lido? We basically believe that Wonderland is more Avalanche-native, and is more likely to succeed as being the best liquid staking solution on Avalanche. Weâre already investors and weâd love to help contribute to an ecosystem weâre already personally part of.
â2-4 years is too longâ
Thanks to @NalX, @astropip, @g_bcn and others for the discussion around this.
Weâve noticed some comments suggesting 4 years is too long a period to pay the team for their work. We actually think the opposite!
Hereâs how we think about it: it aligns our incentives to help grow, maintain and improve our contributions to Wonderland. If our product manages to make $0 for Wonderland, then our revenue share is 25% of zero! We want to make revenue, so weâre economically incentivised long-term to keep growing the marketshare of Wonderlandâs liquid staking.
We see ourselves as an additional external team contributing to Wonderland core. We believe that our ongoing revenue should only increase if the economic value we provide to Wonderland also increases.
We could accept a larger up-front payment, but we think itâs better to be paid more gradually over time in a way that is more dependent on our performance.
Some commenters have suggested 1 year contracts â incentives for this are misaligned. Weâd be incentivised to ship code, not caring about scalability, code quality or future performance knowing that in 1 year weâre potentially kicked out anyway. We think being long-term partners is superior for Wonderland.
Into the future, important infrastructure needs to be maintained, and weâve spoken to Ava Labs core team about changes that might come in the future to Avalanche that would allow us to do things in slightly different ways. Weâd love to continue building those even after weâve shipped v1 in order to make Wonderlandâs liquid staking the best choice for users.
One thing that I do think was not clear in our initial proposal â we agree and believe we should only receive this ongoing revenue if we are actively working to contribute to Wonderland. If we ship it and disappear, the DAO should be able to remove future revenue accruing to our team (and instead could assign it to a new external team, or to pay an internal team).
So, we should word the break clause in a way that protects both our team and Wonderland. We donât want to get rugged by building something and immediately being kicked out of sharing that created value â and similarly Wonderland doesnât want us leeching on them while doing zero work.
We think long-term alignment is important. If we can get rugged after 1 or 2 years, it might be better for us to go to a DAO that is happier to have a more long-term relationship. But we absolutely agree that there needs to be a way to stop paying us if weâre not doing anything.
âWho is the team?â
Thanks to @cryptosteak, @sniperhoef, @0xWicked and many more for their thoughts on this.
Weâd prefer to stay anons, as we live in countries with uncertain regulatory climates, but weâre doxxed to both Dani and @Sifu. Thereâs 5 of us, and weâve been in crypto for between 2 and 8 years depending on which team member youâre asking. Most of us quit our real jobs a while ago to go full-time crypto.
Between us weâve launched billion-dollar startups, built fintechs, and managed financial infrastructure at scale. Weâve designed, built, and operated secure core banking and cryptocurrency exchange systems. Weâre experts in secure application design, cryptographic key management, smart contracts and blockchain integrations. Weâve worked with auditors to attest the security of our systems and our products are trusted by millions of people every day. Weâre extremely proud of the things weâve built, and weâre excited by the opportunity to build for Wonderland.
Part of the reason we think itâs important to align incentives in compensation is so that we donât need to be trusted too much up-front: we want to build trust over time by adding value.
In the worst case scenario where we tried to rug Wonderland, we could only rug half payment of the initial grant from Wonderland by not delivering any product. We could steal $3M and try to run, risking being doxxed to Dani and Sifu.
Similarly, in the worst case scenario where Wonderland governance rugged us, weâd still get half the initial grant paid for our work and then Wonderland would have to learn the codebase and then maintain it themselves.
Structuring compensation this way reduces up-front risk and aligns incentives to work together long-term. Thatâs the relationship we want to build with Wonderland