With the current voting of “WIP8 - Defining Dani’s Role in Wonderland”, the community currently is expressing support for certain limitations on a Co-Founder, and also by extension re-adjusting the discretionary power of the Treasury Manager.
These are great steps towards rules based governance, as the current Treasury Manager, and also as a wMEMO holder, I strongly feel we can take a chance to make further progress on Governance and moving some power over Treasury Asset decision making to the DAO (and voting on WIPs). There are certain actions I believe should be codified in DAO Governance and are laid out below.
Proposed Governance Changes (or Clarification):
1) Re-Allocation of liquid Assets to Illiquid Assets
The DAO should decide whether liquid assets (such as USDT, USDC, MIM, WBTC, WETH, etc) can be turned into which illiquid assets, which includes non-liquid staked tokens or VC investments. These are decisions that TM (or anyone) should not be making unilaterally.
I suggest we vote for a YES/NO for Explicit DAO Approval through WIP on 1) and also if passed voted on 1-A and 1B below.
1-A) For example, we should have CVX been staked into vlCVX? I would propose that we would vote on this retro-actively as there are un-staking event in July and August. (YES/NO)
1-B) A VC Allocation headroom (excluding current ones) should also be voted for. This can be for example max 2.5% of the Treasury before a TM would seek for more headroom for example. (YES/NO)
- Voting or Voting Delegation
This is directly related to vlCVX voting for which pools currently, but this may be apply to other situations. A TM (or this protocol) should not acquire assets for the sole purpose of influencing a vote in another protocol, and a key control factor is having a DAO WIP to determine the voting or vote delegation action.
The two questions to be asked here is:
2-A: DAO should determine through a WIP vote on how WL should vote with held tokens. Such voting direction request should come from the TM. (YES/NO)
2-B: Provided 2-A is voted YES: Delegate vlCVX votes to Votium and delegate to the Bribe Pool Optimizer with the earliest possible Gauge Vote. (YES/NO)
Note that the previous vote into Votium would have yielded US $380,000 by my calculations and votes occur every two weeks.
- The DAO should give certain risk limits over % of Asset Holdings in its Treasury as proposed by the TM (YES/NO).
3-A. Provided the above passes, the current TM (Thats me) proposes the following risk limits:
- Non Stable-coin Directional Exposure 30% of Liquid Assets (BSGG Excluded)
- Stable-coins risk:
a. USDT 25% (about 52 mm USD)
b. USDC 30% (subject to temporary raise for redemption)
c. DAI 25%
d. MIM 25%
e. Combination of all others (or any) 15%, and among these max individual limit 10%
With these DAO decided limits, the treasury manager will have the initially - things such as conflict of interest, and risk limit controls placed on him/her. wMEMO holders can be also rest assured that material changes to the liquidity or risk profiles would have to be proposed to the DAO and get WIP approval.