Objective:
Downsize Wonderland’s treasury to a more manageable size and redirect funds to holders.
- Reduce Wonderland Treasury size from ~140m to a healthy ~30m
- Distribute liquid assets to all wMEMO holders
- Make no changes to illiquid assets and organisational structure
- Compensate current moderators, dev’s and TO’s for shrinking the protocol with a one-off payment of $100.000 (distribution t.b.d.)
Community Interest:
- I would like to see a formal proposal
- I am not interested in seeing more
0 voters
High Level Details:
Downsize Wonderland’s treasury to a more manageable size and redirect funds to holders.
- Reduce Wonderland Treasury size from ~140m to a healthy ~30m
- Distribute liquid assets to all wMEMO holders
- Make no changes to illiquid assets and organisational structure
- Compensate current moderators, dev’s and TO’s for shrinking the protocol with a one-off payment of $100.000 (distribution t.b.d.)
The goal of this proposal is to increase effectiveness of Wonderland due to winding down a large part of the treasury in an effective way that provides value for Wonderland holders. Wonderland is currently traded at ~29k$, whilst having a liquid + illiquid backing of ~36k$/wMEMO. This proposal seeks to distribute a large part of that value back to holders, whilst keeping the Wonderland governance and investment framework in place.
There are two arguments leading to the timing of this proposal.
Wonderland’s treasury is idle
Wonderland transformed from an OHM fork to IAAS (Investing as a Service). The goal is to invest the treasury of ~140m$ in mainly low risk projects and farms to maximise the risk/reward for the wMEMO investor.
However, most of Wonderlands funds are sitting idle. Despite admirable progress in organisational governance and processes, we did not succeed in deploying the treasury in farms and promising project tokens.
The added value of depositing assets in low risk farms is debateable, since this strategy could be implemented by Wonderland’s holders themselves.
The conclusion to be drawn is that Wonderland is too big to effectively manage the treasury and optimise the risk/return ratio for investors.
Risks of Sifu Domination
The Wonderland community currently seems to loose the steering wheel to Sifu when it comes to deciding on the future of Wonderland. Sifu has proven to be a competent treasury manager for Wonderland in the past. However, since he is actively involved and managing a number of other protocols and his own wealth, the risk of conflicts of interest arises.
a) Sifu/SV currently holds >670k TIME for snapshots. In the 10 most recent TMP or WIP votes Sifu is solely responsible for 71% of all wMEMO used to vote, all which logically led to a Win for Sifu. Among these were approved proposals to increase UwU Lendprotocol exposure limit to 20% and Lock UwU-ETH LP tokens.
(Fun fact: In 5/10 Sifu didn’t use all of his wMEMO).
b) Wonderland moderators are employed in Sifu protocols SV and UwU.
c) Appointments of Treasury Operators are assigned by voting which creates dependance.
d) To ensure that Wonderland is not too heavily exposed in some direction the position of Risk Officer is created. Sifu is appointed to this position (a.i.).
e) Sifu managing liquidity.
f) Sifu’s wMEMO bag still increasing due to market buys.
Low Level Details:
When possible, describe more specifically individual components of the subject, focus on the details and present information in a structured way to help the community understand the proposal.
Proposed timeline:
- Take one month (January 1st to January 31st) to communicate treasury distribution
- Distibute assets no more than 1 week after.
- From the moment the proposal is accepted, take no actions that change liquid assets positions.
Furthermore:
- Communicate often and omnichannel to give less active and unaware holders ample opportunity to stake their wMEMO in the farming contract.
- Create separate discussion to settle on distribution for mod, dev and TO compensation.
- T.b.d. a [1 month / 1 year / no ] deadline to how long a TIME / MEMO / wMEMO investor is able to claim liquid backing.
.* The numbers provided in this proposal are not exact, but merely to provide insights.
*edit: previous version of the proposal involved using the rev share farm to dissolve. This is removed although it is effectively the same as using a run-up period of e.g. 1 month. *
Since a DAO Discussion is meant to introduce a proposal, not all information may be available at this stage. The discussion should be used to measure the community’s interest in what is being proposed. If the minimum requirements are met, it can be submitted as a Request for Comments.