[DAO Discussion] Wonderland DAO Amendment

[DAO Discussion] Wonderland DAO Amendment


The scope of this proposal is to turn Wonderland into an organization that serves the vast majority of its token holders. To improve security, ensure stability, and allow flexibility, by creating a team of officers empowered to handle day-to-day operations with less friction.


The purpose of this proposal is to take into consideration legal advice and maintain stability and security. To minimize the threat of a problematic governance affecting day-to-day operations by empowering an elected team to make decisions with less roadblocks and friction. To assure flexibility and responsiveness in a space where these traits are paramount.

Community Interest:

  • I would like to see a formal proposal
  • I am not interested in seeing more

0 voters


The following proposal was crafted after a series of in-depth conversations with legal firms around the world, which led to the realization that we have failed our holders by losing focus on the main objective of the protocol, profits for holders.

As a result of Wonderland’s abstract management, there is a high risk of malicious actors carrying out Governance Attacks in an effort to totalize the system. Protocol stability is affected directly by this, since these actors may accumulate voting power for a brief period of time and promote their own agendas in specific aspects of the Protocol’s day-to-day operations.

Moreover, Wonderland has been subjected to long and inefficient governance procedures, which are susceptible to manipulation. Though we have always focused on the community and how to serve it better, unintentionally we have developed a system that focuses and abides by the loudest people, not the clear majority of silent “stake and chill” token holders. A long and time-consuming governance system, that promotes mob participation rather than a power by shares or delegation in Wonderland, which is host to constant conflict and disagreement between people who, estimated on votes, collectively hold a very small percentage less than 0.1% of the shares.

Furthermore, our Treasury cannot respond quickly to the fast changing market conditions, which is essential in this industry, thereby reducing our performance and putting investor value at risk.

The structure of a DAO, such as ours, involves smart contracts and a collective decision making process that is independent of human control. To allow users to update its rules in any way, from technology upgrades to the slightest financial investment, there is a voting procedure.

One of the problems is that these changes are generally handled in a two-stage or even three-stage process that is slow-moving. Typically, a change is proposed by someone who outlines its specifics and then attempts to raise support for it via social media, or in our case Discord channels and DM groups. The discussion phase of the proposal must continue for a certain period of time.

Next comes the RFC phase where a preliminary vote is held while the Governance Officer monitors the votes, views, likes, and comments. During this stage, you may have a mob voting against a beneficial proposal without any evidence of holdings as the forum is accessible to everybody, not only holders. The actual decision makers, who possess most of the voting power, might be ignored since the proposal can stay in this phase indefinitely if enough people can hold the voting results below 60%. Taking advantage of forum governance, you could hire people just to vote down proposals, indicating a colossal security issue.

If the proposal appears to be beneficial, if it lacks people rallying against it and yet does not get enough attention, then again the system requires manipulation to work to raise awareness and to encourage people to vote, again without any proof of holdings. Wonderland promised the real holders a long term investment opportunity of passive income, and they can “stake and chill” by providing active treasury management, which is inefficient right now, and the revenue sharing system. In the event that sufficient support is received, a second vote, snapshot, will be held to determine whether the proposal will be passed or rejected. The discussion and polling periods last for weeks. Valuable time is lost and until the snapshot vote ends nothing can be implemented.

For a financial proposal, all that is needed is a TMP. With the TMP, essentially it is announced to the entire DeFi community what Wonderland will do in the future. Due to this procedure, a significant amount of yield is lost daily.

As an example, only UwU Lend, which was one of the most controversial proposals and had to be voted on three times, resulted in Wonderland losing an average of $4,000 per day (approximate, impossible to calculate with maximum precision) for every day the proposal was delayed. The Treasury Council decided to lock UwU on 8th of November and the final approval arrived on 8th of December resulting in an approximate amount of $120,000 in damages. This is directly affecting the liquid backing, the yield is considered liquid for the redemption price. Aside from the daily damages, the exposure of this proposal was significant and led to a certain amount of frontrunning. The original proposal for the lock-in UwU LP was drafted with Wonderland at the time looking at around 300% APY returns on investment. However, once the TMP actually passed, a month later, Wonderland was looking at 90% APY returns on investment.

Our seed investment in Interport is another example. As part of Interport’s seed phase presale investment, Wonderland intended to invest $1,500,000 for 7,500,000 ITP at $0.2 per token. Upon approval of the proposal, Interport’s presale had already concluded and the price had changed to $0.3 per token. Ultimately, Wonderland acquired 5,000,000 ITP, resulting in an overall loss of 2,500,000 ITP, or $2,800,000 at the current valuation.

The Swapfish investment was among our Alpha findings. However, yields dropped by over 50% during the TMP delay, when both the Alpha and our intention to join were announced to anyone interested in joining. Giving them days of yield that should have gone to our holders.

Several other positions were canceled or modified as the TMP caused frontrunning and valuable time was lost. Some strategies were never proposed, as they cannot efficiently be implemented with these processes.

As explained, Wonderland’s Treasury is threatened by lengthy procedures and frontrunning opportunities that the Protocol provides by informing the public space in advance of Wonderland’s investments. This tactic would be considered outrageous by any experienced investor. It is common for frontrunners to pay for access to such information, whereas Wonderland leaks it for free via the TMP system, confusing strategic information censorship with transparency.

The purpose is not just to demonstrate how the protocol would be more efficient, but also to highlight how its current structure is unintentionally rugging its holders by being completely inefficient due to the lack of a clear decision making leadership.

It is prudent to establish a successful corporate management structure for Wonderland in order to ensure long-term stability, security and flexibility to reach our full potential and profit the most. Corporate management structures have been developed through decades of experience and billions of dollars of investment, and have been found to be an optimal structure by regulatory agencies and think tanks around the world.

For the Protocol to be successful, secure, and stable, it is essential to have a strong leadership team with decision-making authority. We are in the midst of a bear market where opportunities are limited. Now is the right time to take action and evolve to prevent further losses caused by our systematically flawed experiment and establish a proven working system to do what the vast majority wants. Security, efficiency, stability, performance, profit.

Fortunately, this year, a number of individuals from the community emerged to lead the internal process and maintain the Protocol’s integrity and vision.

Unfortunately, Wonderland has become cluttered with constant discussions meant to stir up controversy in the present day.

Due to the our attempt to be a DAO that wants to have all decisions run through every holder, it operates as a hippie community that is statistically susceptible to failure due to the small number of voices in conflict drawing the attention from what really matters and the lack of flexibility in a space where timely response to conditions is the key to success.

It is imperative to give the team the opportunity to continue with greater efficiency what they have been doing for the past year, despite their limited access. A better management system is one that aligns with real-world trends and lessons learned, rather than reinventing the wheel. The DAO should be responsible for setting the general direction of the organization, while management should be responsible for its day-to-day operations.


A five-department structure was designed based on Wonderland’s current operations to avoid the danger of testing an unfamiliar system which could lead to negative results.

Every department is led by an officer, while the Visionary ensures that Wonderland’s vision is adhered to throughout the organization and supplies valuable insights and knowledge needed to run a multimillion-dollar organization securely, efficiently and effectively.

  • Visionary
  • Communication
  • Finance
  • Compliance
  • Operations
  • Technology

Departments Overview


Supervise all departments in order to ensure that the vision for the Protocol’s growth is implemented and provide knowledge and guidance on delicate decisions. Strong leadership skills are required, as well as the ability to lead and advise.
The founder, Sifu, is proposed to serve as the Visionary of Wonderland.


The voice of Wonderland. Communications, social media, and community platforms are the scope of this department and serves as a meeting point between the various departments and the community at large.
Proposed as Communications Officer of Wonderland is Alice.


Responsible for ensuring that all departments are functioning within their authority, and that power abuse and external influences are not occurring. Make sure respect is accorded to all decisions made by the new management.
Proposed as Compliance Officer of Wonderland is Nal X.


Overseeing all Treasury-related activities. Responsible for the preparation of quarterly Treasury reports for the holders, oversight of the Treasury Team and their payments, community proposals, risk management, and approval of strategies.
Proposed as Finance Officer of Wonderland is ruian.


Make sure that the information is accurate, the structure is appropriate, the internal organization is effective, and that legal advice is followed in cooperation with the Compliance Department. In addition to ensuring Wonderland’s internal operations are efficient, the Operations Department will provide the rest of the departments with solutions to increase day-to-day efficiency. Also, the Operations Department serves as the Protocol’s information bank.
Proposed as Operations Officer of Wonderland is Bamchicka.


It is the responsibility of the Technology department to ensure that the protocol’s technical components meet industry standards. Assuring that all technical operations are functional and properly managed, as well as ensuring that technological resources are geared towards technological advancement and all technical improvements and suggestions are implemented in a timely manner.
Proposed as Technology Officer of Wonderland is Catalyst.

Departments Details

The DAO serves as the organization’s board of directors and elects officers to handle all aspects of the organization’s management. Token holders are provided with close communication every day through our social platforms and discord channels, or they can opt to follow the quarterly performance reports and our monthly treasury reports instead. As per legal advice, establishing this structure will be beneficial for future restrictions and regulations as it closely resembles existing real-world structures.
In order for the Protocol to fulfill its strategic mission, the elected Officers are responsible to collectively establish and publish the operational system that demonstrates how specific activities will be handled. It is expected that the first internal structure report will be provided within a month if this proposal is approved, although all departments will take their positions immediately upon approval. After that, any alterations to the new structure will be published to the DAO quarterly.
In order to ensure frictionless workflows, secure procedures, and adhere to legal advice to prepare for any upcoming regulations, we will implement an internal system of operations that is as close to actual fund guidelines as possible.

Executive Decisions

Officers and the Visionary are responsible for running the Protocol to its fullest extent and handling its daily operations. In the absence of explicit mention and confirmation by them, all previous votes on governance are now to be considered merely as guidelines, not as rules, until a new clear structure about all different aspects of our organization is voted and implemented.

The Compliance and Operations Departments collectively, will create and maintain documentation that will contain all internal decisions on every aspect of the protocol that members should follow. Also it will include all future decisions approved by the DAO on handling delicate to the organization matters. This documentation will be matter of ongoing change and improvement and a live version will always be published online for every DAO member to refer to.

The revised management structure explicitly sets all internal rules. The Operations Department is responsible for documenting all decisions made and sharing this information with the Community Department and the Compliance Department. The Compliance Department is in charge of ensuring that all managerial posts follow every decision to the letter. The Department of Technology is responsible for implementing new features and tech wherever necessary and improving all technological aspects of the organization. The Finance Department is responsible for monitoring the performance of all members of the Treasury Team, optimizing profit while minimizing risk, and overseeing the performance of the treasury team. The Community Department serves as a point of contact between the DAO and the officers. It manages the organization’s communication infrastructure, improves engagement, and ensures that information is made available to all members.

Henceforth, the Visionary and the Officers will be referred to as “members”.

Removal of a member

By the Members

Members may propose the removal of another member by internal vote, with a majority vote being required.

By the DAO

A No-Confidence Vote (NCV) can be proposed by the DAO at any time as a DAO Discussion [DD], with solid reasoning, to replace any member. Since this is a significant subject that might potentially disrupt current operations, the proposed DAO member should bring this matter to the attention of the Team. The Team will undertake an internal inquiry, and the results will be presented. If the findings are adequate, the members will vote to oust the member in question from the organization. If the internal vote to oust the member fails and the situation remains unresolved, the DAO member may initiate the forum-based removal process as follows: The NCV must be posted and remain open in the Wonderland Forum for seven days for discussion before voting. At the conclusion of the seven-day period, a snapshot vote will be conducted. In order to prevent exploitation of the system, if a NCV fails, the member has immunity for three months and during this period can only be removed by an unanimous members’ vote.

Addition of a member

In the event of a member being ousted, unable to fulfill the duties of the position for a prolonged time, or resigning prior to official elections, the members will vote for an interim replacement and an open letter will be posted in the forum following the established procedure of the DAO for hiring officers. The members are holding the responsibility to do the due diligence for every application and to approve the candidacy.

Management Fee

As per industry standards, real world corporate fund standards and legal advice, a 2% annual management fee will be instituted.


Elections will take place each year in June for every department position.
The Operations Department will collect all applications from the 1st to the 7th of June.
On the 8th of June all applications will be published in separate forum posts, during this period the community alongside the members will have 7 days to do due diligence for every applicant.
Six snapshot votes, representing every department, will be posted on 15th of June for a period of seven days. The newly elected members, vote winners, will be announced to the community on 22th of June. There will be eight days of transition from the current management to the newly elected management with the newly elected members participating as observers till the 1st of July when they will assume the responsibilities of their respective roles. The first term will start immediately after the proposal passes.

Governance Forum

A new subcategory, Wonderland Management Proposal (WMP) will be created, replacing the RFC and WIP sections. The DAO Discussion section (DD) may be used by any member of the DAO who wishes to post an official proposal for review by the management team. The management team as whole or any member of the management separately can edit, refine, and promote the proposal to WMP, if the proposal is deemed as beneficial for the DAO and enough participation is reached. The management team may use a direct WMP to obtain DAO approval for controversial or highly important decisions. It should be noted, however, that while this will be the case for any major changes, this option is not mandatory for lesser management changes. The discussion phase timeframe for each WMP prior to moving forward with a Snapshot vote will be determined dynamically by the management team based on the state of emergency, the complexity and the feedback received.


If this proposal passes, the newly elected members and the Visionary will constitute Wonderland Management Team. All responsibilities and authorities for the management of the protocol will be transferred to them. Decisions made using the old governance system serve as guidelines which could be followed until new amendments are voted through a WMP.

Our goal is to implement a system that is as close to real fund guidelines as possible, for a frictionless workflow and a fast, but efficient decision-making process. Implementing a proven system will not only enhance our ability to comply with regulatory requirements, but will also allow us to formulate legally and statutorily acceptable guidelines as well.


Wow. This is quite a lot to take in. I really appreciate the thoroughness of this proposal and see a few good solutions to issues within it. It is quite thick though, and I’m not sure most of this is required as we already have most of it within governance. It makes claims that certain authorities don’t already exist when they do, and makes assumptions about the productivity of thorough discourse regarding Governance Changes. I actually totally agree that the team needs some help being able to process strategies and investments, but I’m hard pressed to get on board the argument regarding governance changes.

This proposal mentions individuals buying up wMemo to ensure certain governance proposals get passed, based on what that individual believes is the right course of action. Sifu, the suggested visionary, is a prime example of this action. Yes, others do it too, but it’s an assumption to say anyone knows for sure it was not in good faith, just as it would be wrong to accuse sifu’s actions in this way as having been in bad faith without evidence.

The main changes in this that I can remember (there’s a lot of text, not a complaint) is:

• We call the team “Managers” now
• Managers have the authority to make some extra decisions (although I can’t actually think of things they shouldn’t be allowed to do now that this would allow them to do)
• It makes All previous governance articles null, now for guidance purposes only (personally fairly concerning to me)
• Adds a new management position for Sifu
• Gives more freedom to management to decide what counts as “enough” for various things like forum engagement or severity of an issue - being able to push or stall things as management sees fit (mind you the DAO just voted on a system they felt was useful for this- feels a little early to call it a failure)
• Establishes a Management Fee for Managers, which I assume just gets split up to cover their pay or is that on top of their salaries?

There’s so much in this that it feels like it’s suggesting sweeping changes that will open the gates to awesome efficiency, but in reality it comes across more as a lengthy way to give elected members more powers (that they technically already have), elect sifu to a leadership position, and abolish all previous governance to start afresh.

Why complain about not having sufficient engagement in the forum to ensure a secure and equitable process? This is a communication problem, do more communication and bring in engagement, find better ways to express the proposals to ensure more people understand and less room for trolls to fuck with you.

A security issue in the forum? Let’s see a proposal to resolve that security issue. I don’t quite understand why it’s suggested that the best solution to making this “better” is to simply rug the process and blame the community for being shitty participants - instead of looking inwardly.

I wholeheartedly appreciate the goals and the desire to increase efficiency, but I don’t feel this proposal solves these issues the right way. I’m a proponent of structuring this organization more like a corporation, when we are a corporation - not before. In addition, I think it is not in our best interests to swiftly abolish previous governance in one fell swoop. I would find it more responsible to take this it stages, amending what we want to change and removing what we don’t want anymore - no need to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

If I could sum up my feelings about this proposal in a single sentence; It feels like your pitching a Whole New Protocol, like SifuVision with extra steps.


What about the risk officer, or treasury operators? No more treasury council?

We don’t need a risk officer anymore as long as sifu has a position somewhere? (Yes a dig, but I feel a justified one considering the optics). I like sifu, I imagine I’m not the only one thinking that.

I have a feeling the team might not appreciate the duality of our position. The team is amazing, you all have made such great progress with Wonderland against all odds - but we cannot forget the other aspects within this equation that have kept us healthy and prosperous. This discourse that is complained about, the “loud voices”, and the dragged out governance processes - they have all been a part of this equation too. While I have a lot of faith in the team and confidence in their skills, I also believe that the community and much of the adversity the community brings to the table has been an integral part of this effort. I think it would be overconfident to assume that the community, and the difficulties in dealing with the community, has been a pitfall to our stability.

I can totally understand various changes that help make different process more secure, stable, effective, or efficient. But I believe much of our charm and stability has been born through this unorthodox approach to growth and building structure. At some point, I would bet most if not all of these proposed changes will end up being enacted, and I’ll find myself supporting those changes along the way. I don’t think that’s today though.

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Under the current structure, where day-to-day operations are influenced directly by the DAO as a whole, it is possible to accumulate wMEMO for passing a proposal to your advantage. You make a reference to Sifu, but Sifu is a long time holder, same is true for the other whale too. This argument isn’t for them. This is a security issue which sooner or later, I’m afraid we would have to face, especially providing the Redemption opportunity. Sifu’s proposed role is to provide advice and guidance, something he has been doing since the Protocol was founded, by him, Dani and Georgiy. With this proposal, Wonderland will be able to benefit from his expertise once again.

The majority of our holders do not participate in Wonderland’s Governance, and the more stability you provide, the less participation there is. During the days when we did not have access to Twitter or proper access to forums, we could not use our existing medium space and had to create a new, we had multiple times the participation we have today. Although there has been an increase in engagement through our social media platforms, participation has decreased. I strongly believe that the tools we are offering are tools for passive income, and our users are doing exactly that, staying passive.

I do not blame the community for being “shitty participants”; I am pointing out all the problems I see and offering a complete solution. I find security flaws and bugs on a daily basis as part of my professional responsibilities. Our forum is being abused by users who create second accounts to falsify the results of voting. Several of these members are very active and vocal, but again, I understand that if there is an opportunity for exploitation, people will take advantage of it. I’m suggesting solutions to protect the Protocol from all the dangers I’ve identified whilst providing flexibility for improvement.

There will be no other form of payment.

Sifu.Vision is not a DAO. At any time, the DAO may vote to replace members of its management, if they wish. Nobody has free pass.

Risk Officer was needed since we did not have anyone experienced enough in DeFi to be able to point out mistakes which could cost us a great deal of money. Hopefully now we will have Sifu. If Sifu leaves, Wonderland will find somebody else, like any of the other positions. There will be no changes to the Treasury Operations job description with this proposal. We have replaced the Governance Officer position with a Compliance Officer since we realized that this position is the most pertinent and necessary.

Unfortunately, neither of these participants nor the loud voices represent the rest of the token holders. I believe that most of these voices do not belong to the holders at all. Token holders are the primary focus of Wonderland’s staff. Most of our holders hold passively, so we must protect them by creating a structure that prevents a few loud voices from drawing attention towards them. Discourse contributed a lot towards this. We need to see the bigger picture, work efficiently.


Do you mean with TMPs? We’re not supposed to be using TMPs. We’re supposed to have a functional system with the elected members, an RO, and a treasury council. You all got placed in your roles a few weeks ago, and the entire time you haven’t had an opportunity to function with an RO, or without an RO but an amendment that would allow you to function with the internal secrecy that you already have.

The arguments being put forward that this organization can’t function like this is accurate, only because it indeed is Not supposed to function like this. You’re not supposed to send everything to a TMP, and you haven’t even had a chance to try not sending stuff through TMP (except when sifu was interim-RO).

Do you get where I’m coming from here? Like, you present the argument that “we just can’t keep acting like this” and “nobody would find this acceptable”, when you’re not even supposed to be doing this anyway - it’s a shitty failsafe that shouldn’t even exist. You’re complaining about having to use the emergency exit stairs instead of the elevator, when the elevator exists but is broken and you could post a proposal to fix it but instead you spend time proposing we just burn down the building and start over with no stairs.

Why not fix the RO WIP to allow for some way to still work the way you are supposed to already? Or put out a new RO call letter and try to get a good person in the position so you all can work the way you are supposed to? Why throw the whole governance system out to fix a problem that’s not actually a problem?

I always find this argument interesting. Each time it’s brought up why he should be in a position, this is used. Then he doesn’t get the position, and he sticks around to help anyway. He has the deepest internal access of any member of this organization. If he is continuously denied a position, is there any point in which he would not provide insights to the team anymore or help keep wonderland’s vision on track with his unlimited access to internal operations in the discord? This suggestion that we could miss out on his guidance and insights if we don’t give him a position is concerning more than it is motivating, imo.

And the best course of action is to further limit avenues of participation? Does this make your job easier or the DAO more secure? I’m leaning toward your jobs easier, as there’s no reason our team should not be able to communicate with the community effectively enough to mitigate trolls and bad actors. I can’t agree that the solution is to force less engagement, just because you believe most people don’t want to engage.

You’re suggesting we nullify all our past governance, disregard recently enacted governance frameworks without even attempting to try them out as they were designed, restructure our governance framework to provide more centralized control, appoint a member to a new position, and more - that’s a hell of a lot of change and little room for flexibility, to solve some security concerns and increase efficiency in a system you aren’t even using as prescribed currently.

This is exactly the point I was trying to make. From this statement, it comes across as though the RO position could’ve been designed to get sifu in a position so WL would have his insights. Now that he wasn’t voted into that position, we have this New position that makes the old one not needed anymore. Was it that we needed sifu or that we needed an RO? We never even got to try the RO, except for when sifu was interim.

Again, you’re suggesting wiping out all past governance, disregarding recent frameworks without even trying them out, and not even Attempting to amend the RO position and/or try another call letter before you thought it was easier to just scrap it and make a new position that fits sifu so well yet again. I’m sure I’m coming off as a sifu hater here, I’m not. It’s just really weird that you would not even try amending the RO or going for around too before jumping to a new sifu option.

I would much more prefer a proposal to fix various issues that could get us working the way we’re supposed to be working, before we make such incredibly drastic changes like nullifying all past governance. I’m struggling so hard to even understand why that’s included other than making your jobs easier by starting fresh.

This isn’t described in this proposal, and the logical assumption if all past governance is going to be nullified, would be that there are no TOs or Treasury Council. When you nullify all past governance, it’s all gone - everything you want from there forward needs to be in that starting document or it doesn’t exist anymore. If this moves forward, which I assume it will, I would suggest at the least clarifying a few things from past governance and including them in here, like the TOs and Treasury Council.

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Not opposed to the proposal except that a 2% annual management fee on $100m+ of assets seems excessively high ($2m+ a year). This isn’t a hedge fund or private equity fund led by top names with decades of experience that have proven themselves worth a 2% fee.

I’d suggest a much lower management fee to start with (<0.5%) plus a percentage of returns above a certain threshold (a hurdle rate). For example, if an investment generates more than 15% returns for the DAO, management receives 20% of any additional returns beyond the 15%.

With a lower set fee of 0.5% plus an opportunity to share in returns, management is incentivized to create value for the DAO, rather than sit back and collect $2m+ a year with no incentive to create returns.


I feel a plausible solution for reconstructing our entire governance bylaws to start fresh would be to have the DAO’s legal representatives read our past governance and write up our new bylaws for our organization. This should cover all the areas around structure and governance actions, and would be thoroughly detailed to help protect liabilities for both members and managers, as well as bring us closer to compliance with sections we may not consider as nonexperts in corporate law and financial regulation.

It is comforting to read that legal firms were consulted, but personal consultations with firms does not equate to legal representation and experienced consideration of all variables for a new, all encompassing governing document that nullifies all past governance.

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I for one would like to participate more but as most holders we do not have enough knowledge nor do we have time to keep up with advanced topics and complex processes. What might be a good idea is to setup a delegation process where there can be appointed community representatives and we can delegate our vote to our selected representative who in turn will vote on our behalve.


Oh wow …. Sounds like the restart we need, get everything setup like the founder originally envisioned and have legal guide us to build a strong foundation. Let’s Goooooo Team. That’s the family business i would like to do after I finished my hunting


To make sure my intentions here are clear: if you put a separate proposal up that suggested putting sifu in a position of visionary with the responsibilities described in this, but with nothing else attached, I would support that.


Or drop the management fee altogether and keep the 20% over 15% returns only. I would be ok with 25% over the 15, too.
Motto: “put your skin in the game”.


I see this as a big reformation. Having read all your comments I think the intention is slightly unclear. I am sure Cata will comment to your comments later himself, but the general idea is to build a working system, based on corporate standards, with the legal we’ll onboard with and the original vision plus already done work. That itself will take a while - and with the processes we have now even longer (and easy manipulated).

Have a look at everything that works and doesn’t and instead of amending single things in a long winded process piece by piece - build a strong setup that enables the protocol to work efficiently for real while this is done.
Our structure is made out of puzzle pieces, our participation low, our system confusing for everybody and there is no easy fix for that.
As well as it’s manipulatable, in several angles and ways, which is something we notice, new framework was supposed to help with that - but it’s not and that is easy to see.
Nobody wants to demolish everything we’ve build - that’s why “old governance” will be the guidelines for the new system that would openly be implemented.
There are so many basic things missing, others restrictive, inefficient, slowing down our process.

A clean cut and rebuild in a way that enables an always productive “stake and chill” approach, as well as getting actively involved.


If we don‘t have a management fee how do I pay for lawyers? 🥲

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You, personally will pay for the DAO’s lawyers? Why? If the DAO needs lawyers, then it’s the DAO’s cost, not yours. (I read the proposal, did I miss something?)

(Also, did you find a law firm that accepts payment in crypto? :thinking:)

Management does :joy:
And no, not paying in crypto - legal onboarding will include Wonderland being able to have a bank account and pay stuff 🫡

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I still don’t get it. My understanding is like the management needs “salary” to pay another employee’s (the lawyer) salary? Shouldn’t the DAO pay every employee’s salary? What do I miss here?

Overall I like this proposal. I think the expansion and restructuring of departments makes sense and shares a lot of the work, also expanding the team and strengthening the DAO at it’s core.

One thing I don’t get:

Here we have a whole long and lengthy restructuring proposal, with one of the key points being to label Sifu as ‘Visionary’ and then everything else worked and reworked underneath.

What I don’t understand is, why does Sifu not just take the RO position (we can still call it ‘the Visionary’) and we eliminate most every problem that has just been brought to light and can just continue on the course we’re on without the lengthy delays and security/front running risks?



I love the idea of expanding the team personally, I believe it would be wiser to focus on expanding the current roles in place rather than redefining them.

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I don’t care about the team getting juicy salaries as long as they’re making the holders money. On the other hand I’d say a clause needs to be implemented that the management fees should never be allowed to exceed the profits made. Otherwise you’re just Rugging the holders. How to measure that as people need to eat and buy diapers each month is another question and I’ll be happy to come up with a solution.