I think the way for for this DAO should be completely Democratic. Should be a simple mathematical formula to set the amount of time/wmemo to a null value and just recognize a wallet holder as one vote of equal power to all frogs. It’s been a while since I’ve done programming, but this seems like it would be completely doable. Anyway. What does everybody else think about this?
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You can create any amount of wallets.
Those who have more skin in the game should have more voting power. I don’t see why in general whale balancing mechanism is required besides very rare cases.
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Well I gave it some thought overnight. I think that this could be overcome by just adding the multiplier of length of time. The coin is held at a non-zero sum (we could determine the community minimum level needed to be held). I just think buying your way to the to to more voting power needs to be taken out of the equation.
Length of time? So you basically suggest something like the frog index? [NEW PROPOSAL] Introducing the FROG INDEX for fair voting power redistribution in the DAO
The balance has to be maintained among the following:
- Length of time
- Those who have more skin in the game
- Make sure speculator(s) whales are kept at bay
Well, it’s slightly different in that I would set the amount that you hold to a null value. I thought that that proposal was good but I think putting it That part of the proposal with a catchy title like I made for the post “one vote one frog of equal power” could generate more of a response with clear wording and a simple message.
I disagree. I think that it should only be based on how long you held the token. That way there’s more incentive for people to vote. If you think your vote is worth less, you’re less likely to turn up simple as that.
A modification with a catchy title, that’s more likely to generate sentiment to drive people to vote more. My edit would be “FROG” INDEX = WALLET SIZE(null value always set to 1) * HOLDING PERIOD COEFFICIENT (i.e. DAYS).
So basically what I suggested in the frog index topic? 
it will cut away short term speculators. at same time it will give huge power to some big whales who bought at the beginning for a steal
We must account the people who invested big amount of money somehow. Just like in real life, the higher number of shares of a company you buy, you have a higher voting power in that company.
If the vote is about policy that doesnt have a financial impact then i believe this is where it should be a one vote weight.
If its a financial vote then i believe the vote should be weighted by amount of tokens held. I believe this is fair as people with large quantity of money should have an impact on direction that is different from those with lower risk value.
Real democracy is ungovernable, a representative republic can be corrupted if people are uninformed. A perfect governance is an informed community.
Besides, we rose up to defeat the whale minority-majority in the past. I believe if a vote was so unpopular that the community would rise up again.
I don’t know. I didn’t read all the comments. I’m glad to see somebody else had the same idea though. What do you think of the name for an RFC being one vote one frog of equal voting power and then explaining the only multiplier being length of time owned. Also, I was thinking instead of making the length of time static for every month you hold that adds an additional 2x mutiplier to that wallet associated.
Yes, we must fight the good fight to inform those lesson informed, but I truly believe that setting the vote to equal one vote per wallet times times the length hold with a multiplier for every month held will lead to a more sustainable fair power structure.
I think time held should absolutely carry the highest weight in voting. Perhaps a seniority multiplier during voting? I would beg to say have even a seniority multiplier for staking. It would not be impossible to produce. Address history is on the blockchain.
If you want to give power to people with a lot of money, then you’ll count their balance. That’s just the math of power currently. I think maybe a compromise might be counting the the holding amount only if it’s held for over a month and they don’t get the weight of the power if the amount newly staked represents over, say, over 1% of current staked governance. What do you think of that compromise?
Yes, I think it would keep individuals from buying exclusively to sway a vote. Perhaps vest the voting weight? Your vote would be worth 25% of your total balance for every say 2 weeks vested or whatever vesting period the dao votes perhaps?..thoughts…
Yeah that’s a good idea. Something along the line of a formula like so:
Frog = (get balance date vested) if (balance vested) => TBD% { voting power += 12.5% balance vested cycle 8 weeks till 100% voting power achieved} else { balance vested *2(double per additional month held)}
Sorry I use to do a bit of programming if you didn’t get what I put in there. Let me know and I can just write it out. Long hand.