PROPOSAL: Fast-forward time back to the future using OHM mechanics + use time-locked unstaking

Hello Time Keepers, I’m requesting your services. I’ve been accidentally shifted to this parallel timeline where our collective has become so fearful of OHM narrative that we’ve burned through all the fixed points in time in just few days (migration to wMEMO, VC investments, airdrops, liquidations and buybacks, treasury manager controversy, merge with spell). Now after we found excuses to believe it was a scam all along due to fearful short-term price action, especially after mishandling liquidations near backed value, even the core team seriously considers winding down time for everyone (WIP #4), destroying project by forcing redistribution of all remaining treasury near the best entry price for no good reason after market had been recently OK paying even 5x premium to capture the market cap. Changing plans in bear market sets a bad precedent, so I’m joining with the request for Wonderland to take responsibility over the original plan, keep the added value of VC activities, and do buybacks below backing value (preferably punishing those who trigger liquidations and buy below backing value, or those who got liquidated there, because taking any leverage at the bottom is stealing from stakers, protocol should be the one taking the leverage if anyone).

As investors into a decentralized reserve currency, we were promised the OHM mechanics of 3,3 to be fully played out and improved along the way. I’d like to propose prioritizing the original promise and returning back to the OHM narrative, because it seems the transition to only using wMEMO was too fast for the community to properly understand its implications, pointlessly causing FUD of perception that the APY had been scam all along, even though the nature of TIME LP mathematically still allows us to push the wMEMO price up to any point within the runtime as a kind of time-travel. It’s just that this is unreasonable as long as market is still willing to sell even near backing price. We don’t have the 3,3 sentiment yet if stakers just wait for a quick pump to exit. There are no benefits in stabilizing the price at the bottom, and the dilution of bonds hasn’t been our primary issue yet. First, I propose for the APY runtime to be returned back to the dashboard, and to make treasury decisions based on its sustainability. Second, I suggest to take a more deliberate focus on forward guidance depending on market conditions instead of merely forcing the treasury inflow to keep the APY sustainable. For example, right now the market is fearful and below backing, so we don’t need to waste our runtime of which we had over 400 days at the current APY. Once the price stabilizes, burning through some runtime will help increase wMEMO price without the need of new stakers, and at least it’ll make more short-term investors exit, taking wMEMO out of market, which should be our goal instead of hoping to just make treasury large. Fast-forwarding runtime more than 30 days would reward everyone who stays in. For example with 400M treasury, we can just accelerate time to return us back to 1.2B market cap, likely attracting new stakers along the way. As a forward guidance, by promising that we will accelerate time again if there is a large sell-off, we likely won’t have to. This strategy won’t work in long-term, but if we are in crisis, we should recognize that we still have “time” (TIME above 1$) as means of rewarding strong hands if we believe they won’t sell (or better, contract them not to). Inverse bonds can take runway into consideration: Inverse Bonds - Olympus (Bonds that pay out risk-free assets will shorten the runway. Bonds that pay out other assets will extend the runway.) Introduce Inverse Bonding

If everyone cooperated in Wonderland, it would generate the greatest gain for everyone. As long as the premium is high, we need the majority of stakers to be comfortable playing long-term and not selling based on any recent market conditions. We’re more interested in sharing our stake with money that is also willing to commit as strong hands. You clearly see the human nature of hype bubbles, where the majority of new investors sell shortly afterwards, and there is no inflow during bear market, so I’d suggest to offer highest APY to those who are willing to take on additional constraints. It’s easier to filter beneficial investors now that we’re at the bottom, but we’d likely risk their unwillingness to stay time-locked and the goal of being a liquid reserve currency wouldn’t work. OHM had a discussion at OIP-9: Locking - OlympusDAOForum but hasn’t implemented this. For example Atlantis | AutoShark is one case study of this approach. Time-locked staking could still accelerate sell pressure at the moment of re-staking at expiration during bear markets, so I would suggest the opposite approach, which is to make MEMO->TIME unstaking take a longer, policy-controlled period during which no yield is given. This would further encourage using wMEMO liquidity, disincentivizing unstaking unless there is a large arbitrage for which we are willing to wait, and incentivizing buying wMEMO after any increased TIME yield, so that everyone benefits during times of market inactivity. This could also address the problem of minting, where the most optimal strategy had been to constantly sell TIME during positive discounts. If the premium gets too high, I’d much rather have the protocol do the selling instead of rewarding predatory behavior.

To protect investors from arbitrary DAO decisions like trying to liquidate the entire treasury without everyone’s individual consent, DAO should also evolve to make sure this can’t happen anymore. For inspiration, Constitution - [REDACTED]

In long term, this Wonderland crash could have the potential for the following benefits if our timeline stays positive (we’ve yet to see if we’ve locked in the betrayal of community as irreversible or not):

  • we test the buyback/refund mechanism, ensuring the entire treasury under multisig is used only for our benefit without unfair loss
  • we reward strong hands and shake off anyone selling low (harmful actors who don’t understand and trust the ohm mechanics in the first place, but sadly also those who panic sold after buyback issue), reducing dilution (it’s easier to grow with smaller treasury)
  • we recognize the premium of wonderland community once 3,3 kicks in and majority stops selling
  • we create DAO constitution to avoid further attempts at randomly redistributing treasury
  • we stress-test and judge danielesesta’s ability to make optimal decisions without betraying community, proving if whales weren’t intentionally rewarded, so that those of us who want to support him can help save his reputation by allowing a transition of leadership while staying a part of the same ecosystem, and we also force community to make controversial decisions as groundwork for stronger growth in the future

If you vote YES, you ask team to commit to the original OHM narrative, prepare a scenario to fast-forward time while rewarding strong hands, and consider a transition towards a sustainable model with time-locking that better rewards collaborative behavior

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