[WIP #14] DAO Direct Governance over Specific Treasury Actions and Strategy
Scope:
This WIP seeks to empower the DAO to vote on such specific matters and better define control over the Treasury Manager for specific actions.
These include impactful actions such as voting with tokens/coins held by treasury, or allocations of capital that materially change the liquidity of such allocation (such at staking Convex in a vault.
Explicit DAO Approval for allocation of tokens into long term defined lock ups (over 1 week for example) such as CVX.
Explicit DAO Approval for economically impactful or impactful voting from the DAO’s holding tokens in other protocols. For example, this can be CVX for bribes or in the future voting on a DAO action that might have considerable effect on the other protocol.
DAO Community can propose via the WIP process to instruct the TM to liquidate positions as needed.
Options:
Yes, implement specified DAO control
No, make no changes
[WIP #14.1] Vote on Convex Position
Scope:
Contingent that WIP 14 passes, I also propose that the community vote on the liquidation of the Convex position by unstaking the CVX and then having the TM liquidate it as immediately as possible.
Background:
The community has expressed since April the conflict of interest over Convex and its gauge voting activity with Abracadabra.
In order to clear this conflict, there has been desire from the community to liquidate the position. Therefore, this WIP is being proposed contingent on WIP 14 passing.
Will there be quarterly summaries that can outline DAO position changes? (I.e. blank coin is up 20% since dao entry). This would allow the casual DAO member to see how the positions have been doing since the last time they looked at the summary.
I think for treasury actions it should really just go RFC and WIP. And the 4 day waiting period should be abolished. It takes too long to get things done with this schedule.
How would we view this rule if a TM were to acquire/take a position in a distressed protocol and then wanted to use the acquired tokens to vote/participate in that protocol’s governance?
Example: Protocol A is a treasury backed token trading significantly under its backing value. WL TM comes along and acquires a significant holding. In Protocol A, a governance vote is then put up to do a partial redemption. Does the TM need explicit DAO approval to vote with the acquired tokens if this was the purpose of the acquisition in the first place?
If yes, my main concern would be the time it takes to push the DAO approvals through.
If we are going to begin placing restrictions on TMs that require DAO governance to approve certain actions, I agree there needs to be an expedited process for approvals.
Agree that the TM should be able to go ahead in these situations. I was just concerned with the current wording it does seem that there is the potential to get tied up in approving governance participation in other protocols regardless of the initial intent.
So happy to see this moving forward. I think this framework, in combo with a separate expedited treasury management governance framework as @NalX seems to be suggesting, will be a great direction for a DAO to go. Thank you again for the solid work @TheSkyHopper
The proposal for DAO Direct Governance over specific treasury actions and strategy has passed with over 94% of votes in favor. https://wl-l.ink/Snapshot/WIP-14
