Wonderland 2.0 + The Professor

General Discussion
1

I think the Wonderland 2.0 (currently in RFC) Wonderland 2.0. A strategized move forward | by Wonderland 2.0 | Medium and the Professor medium post compliment each other very well Wonderland: The Rise, Fall (and Comeback) of the world’s largest DAO. | by The Professor | Medium

NOTE: NOT ALL OF THIS NEEDS TO BE PASSED AT THE SAME TIME. IT WOULD BE BETTER IF IT WAS BROKEN OUT.

Please refer to each proposal for details.

:small_orange_diamond:Exit Option
Both proposals offer an option for investors to exit at the backing price. I agree this should occur because if we do not, those who don’t want to stay could potentially tank any snapshot votes we have to rebuild. The vote not to unwind was very close (55/45).

Also, the DAO guaranteed that the backing price would be honored. The Professor has a great write up here Raging in Wonderland. How a Rage Quit Solution can be a fair… | by The Professor | Medium. He also details HOW the buy-back would occur though I think that should be determined by Devs as to the best way.

Many are concerned with a lower treasury would mean a lower return on your investment. This is not the case. Simply because the wMEMO exchanged for backing would then be burned. Below is an example of 50% of wMEMO holders exiting at the backing price, and Tom’s ROI afterwards

image

Also note that Daniele mentioned in Discord that most crypto deals are usually lower than $10m

image

So even if 50% leave, which I think is worse case, our Treasury would still be quite large for VC investments. Remember our Treasury is only this low because the entire crypto market is down. Less than half our treasury value is in stables right now. There’s always the potential to raise money down the line as well. Forget about the whales. It sucks, but they have every right to buy at these prices. I’m no whale and I added.

Betswap (BSGG) Professor calls for only including the airdrop portion (500m Shares).

:small_orange_diamond:New Token
Both proposals suggest a new token. The Professor recommends just one that receives a monthly airdrop of earned revenue. This does not make sense to me. Every revenue sharing token/protocol requires staking which gives you a new token in exchange. Abra, Curve, Convex, etc.

The 2.0 proposals makes more sense. It offers the gMEMO (governance token), which has a capped supply, and the wSHARE (revenue staking token), which has a dynamic supply. The wSHARE token is received in exchange for staking your gMEMO in the revenue share.

:small_orange_diamond:Revenue Sharing
Big difference between these two proposals, and this would probably be better discussed with the future Treasury manager and passed separately from everything else.

The Professor suggest just air dropping MIM to the 1 token for the DAO. This would be much different that any other revenue sharing protocol like Abracadabra, Convex, Curve, etc. which require staking and a receipt token.

The 2.0 proposal offers two different pools for staking your gMEMO

  • MIM Dividend Pool: wSHARE is converted to MIM. These will be automatically pushed to the end-user once a user-defined threshold is reached (depending on gas sensitivity).

  • wSHARE Compound Pool: the wSHARE is converted back into gMEMO through buybacks on a linear basis over 180 days. The user can recover any amount of unconverted wSHARE at any time through the staking contract but will pay the performance fee on that amount as per the chart below.

I recommend just one compounding pool.

  • Revenue share % details to be decided by DAO
  • Minimum Stake period to be eligible revenue share?

:small_orange_diamond:No Rebases, no buybacks
With new token, no more rebases and no more buybacks.

:small_orange_diamond:Community Governance/Voting
Per the 2.0 Proposal: gMEMO holders get voting power according to duration and size of their investment: Voting power = sqrt(average gMEMO balance 30 days). If this is feasible. I’m not sure how it would work with Snapshot.

:small_orange_diamond:Governance Structure
The 2.0 Proposal seems too complex for me and this is the main change. I do not think we need the Oversight Committee. I think the structure by The Professor is much better. Of course the DAO would still have oversight.

  • CSO/CEO - Dani will be responsible for hunting for investment opportunities and everyone below will report to him.

  • CFO - Doxxed Treasury Manager. He may hire (perm or consult) other reputable proven investors if they offer different strategies he/she is not strong at. (e.g. arbitrage traders, yield farming experts, etc.)

  • COO - Manage everything not related to money such as Discord, Social media, Communications, Wonderland Forum and Snapshot Proposals, etc.

  • CTO - Head Dev

Each of these can hire where they see fit. Submit budget to for approval by DAO.

:small_orange_diamond:Treasury Management
The 2.0 proposal has a section on this. I think we pocked this for now until we find our CFO and include it in that proposal/snapshot.

:small_orange_diamond:Other
There are some other items in both not listed here that I don’t think we need to vote on right now, but will be important for the future such as a Treasury Dashboard, Revenue Share %, monthly audits, etc.

19 Likes
2

These are good suggestions. I like the idea of merging the best options into 1.

I noticed some talk about us just becoming a stable farm. I would recommend some language or ideas about how much we farm and how we remain a VC and make investments. Harry Yeh and Skyhopper could be great combo but do we want someone else looking for the VC / degen plays who takes that specific role?

Just throwing that out there.

2 Likes
3

Yes, I absolutely think the DAO can vote a Degen in and give him some play money as part of the overall strategy.

4

It is short enough that those with short attention spans can read it.
Removed last part because I missed the misc part at the bottom.

5

I do think the oversight committee is important for the dão because

1 ordinary participants don’t have the time to do a close monitoring of what is going on. Having a group of people whose job it is to do so who are also independent of the team will make sure any malfeasance is swiftly uncovered. This is important for credibility.

2 ordinary dão members can be ignored by a management or called fud if they raise legitimate concerns. They have an uphill battle to dissent and most people will go for the peaceful solution and exit instead of voice. This is a loss for the community. If an oversight committee member starts asking questions, it can be done in private without creating fud and resolved or if not, corrective action can be taken.

3 if we set this right, the oversight committee members are accountable only to the dão as a body, while all the other team are accountable to the CEO and beholden to them for their role. This will make challenging difficult.

In light of the incentives to act and respond, it’s worth the bureaucracies.

5 Likes
6

I thought the W2.0 idea of splitting the treasury across multiple managers is potentially a good one if a measure of ROI within specific timeframes can be made. ie for each quarter can the ROI of treasury managers who have had investments made over a longer time period be compared reliably to other short term investments/gains.

This could incentivise performance competition between investment managers.

I agree a merger of these two proposals seems like a promising way forward and neither should go to WIP unti there’s been adequate consideration of how to get the best from both.

3 Likes
7

This snapshot idea needs to go, we really want whales and arbs to dump on us when we finally reach backing again? That will crush any uptrend dynamic we would have.

8

I spoke about this in the 2.0 thread. I’m all for having different investment managers/strategies. Not sure if they necessarily need to be compared or compete as they would probably have different ROI targets. The idea of having multiple is moreso to diversify the portfolio.

The Treasurer/CFO would be in charge of hiring anyone. Or if Dani or the DAO have good recommendations they can be presented as well.

4 Likes
9

Yeah, I agree. I’ll remove that language

10

I don’t think we need the oversight committee. We can rely on regular audits being performed, financial reports, and the fact that everything is done on the multisig wallet.

I think finding such an oversight committee to begin with would be incredibly difficult.

11

I agree with what you said. These two need to be merged :smiley:

2 Likes
13

Recruiting may not be as hard as you’d think. There are enough smart people on wonderland willing to make a modest commitment but not make it into a full time job.

I think the main issue with relying upon just community and transparency for oversight is it means anyone who sees something wrong has to put their head into the firing line and shout. We’ve all seen legitimate dissent and concern in various project Discords drowned out by people calling them fud and shouted down. Few people would say anything instead of just selling out if they discover something bad.

An oversight committee (maybe smaller) can’t be ignored or dismissed so easily. And they don’t need to put our dirty laundry out in the public. If there’s a question, it can be resolved to their satisfaction without creating fud. If there’s wrong doing they can escalate governance.

The key is finding people who can do this and are not beholden to the CEO or other team members.

1 Like
14

I made updates to include details from the Professor’s latest post. Most of it I agree with and already had it incorporated. The one item I didn’t agree with was his idea of just one token. No revenue sharing protocol has just 1 token. You always have to stake which you would receive a staking token in exchange.

15

Is it possible that the token is necessarily staked? This would be the case if we went with something in line with the popular ‘Node’ mechanism where buying x number of tokens gets you a yield bearing asset. I think the ‘Node’ idea feels very ‘me too’ at this point - but I think yield bearing NFTs could be fresh. And to get back on topic would allow for a single token.

1 Like
16

Yeah that’s possible. I think that’s more complicated than just staking though. Staking is a normal thing in a revenue sharing protocol.

17

I like rebases, this is why all of people came at the first time.
Don’t like backing prices

18

Rebases are meaningless when there’s no minting. Just constant stock splits.

2 Likes
19

In the Wonderland 2.0 I believe we need an oversight committee. That way others can just focus on their job. But may not be a big deal. Also in Wonderland 2.0 it mentions taking the treasury and putting it into low risk farms. Can we just leave it as is for now. I know you mainly touched on the big stuff but thought I throw this in because that part of 2.0 proposal would mean selling our assets correct? I wouldn’t sell anything at this bottom or close to this bottom market.

Also, getting the Rage Quit votes out before we do/vote on anything is 100% correct. Proposal - Offer Rage Quit Before Other Decisions Are Made

20

It does not matter if the wMemo gets burned. The intrinsic value is gonna fall regardless if the treasury gets reduced.

1 Like
21

It matters a great deal if tokens are taken out of circulation. It increases your personal share in the protocol. Math explains it all. Not sure what you’re debating.