Treasury management has been a hot topic recently. We believe a decentralised treasury management model is the solution to concerns that have been raised. What does that look like?
We’ll no longer have a single treasury manager, instead we’ll have an oversight committee, a financial officer and a whole bunch of small investment managers.
Investment managers — Any person or team can submit a proposal to manage part of Wonderlands treasury. When approved their results and behaviour are closely monitored.
***** The fund is stronger with the money together not divided up. When you designate investment managers in this scenario you’re diluting the ROI to the Wonderland holders because you’re just increasing the overall overhead with fees and making the overall process more bogged down with more cooks in the kitchen. Not only that you’re putting the trust of our money is someone’s hands that may or may not have a clue on what they are doing. This isn’t that big of a fund where you need all these people. If you had a team of 10 you’d be fine. *********
Oversight committee — The oversight committee keeps a close eye on all investment managers. They make sure that the investment managers stay in-line with the DAO’s decisions. They can pull the treasury capital from investment managers at any time
******** I think what you mean is head of internal audit which would be just one person and they would report to the Board and only the Board. You don’t call this an oversight committee. ***********
Financial officer — The financial officer is responsible for the day-to-day operations regarding all Wonderlands finances. Just like the investment managers, the financial officer too is monitored by the oversight committee.
********* Again way too many cooks in the kitchen. You don’t need to employee all these people. The whole point of the senior leadership is to oversee these items. ***********
********Your plan is weak at best. It doesn’t develop key outlines on what the structure would look like, who would be doing the external audit, if we would have an external audit, would it be made public and how us follow frogs will be able to have any transparency in this process outside of becoming one of these key people you outlined. *********
Also it cleanly shows that you’ve never managed money before which scares the hell out of me.
Firstly, those who no longer wish to participate in the DAO may redeem any wMEMO purchased prior to Jan 29, 2022, 6:00AM UTC for treasury equivalent MIM at the backing price. Obviously, this will still be a loss for most people.
It’s no taking responsibility for the bad communication, decision and behavior that left us in the situation that we are now.
First of all have to be restored the trust. to accomplish those at least should be fullfed the promised that was made like:
BSGG Airdrop announcement on twitter and discord like a month ago by Sifu
Refund announcement on twitter by Daniele and in Discord by Sifu for the two black days liquidation below backing price (they said, they will pay with their own pockets, no treasury involve).
Daniele said that he will burn some personal wMEMO. Actually was a discussion here inside the forum and a poll and burn wMEMO wins.
Give a rage quit option at backing pierce per wMEMO.
Accomplishing these promises made by the owner and the CFO of Wonderland, you remove the fud, the hatred and open a path to a new bright future.
Its very important the snapshot that will be used, I personally believe that the BSGG Airdrop announcement is the fairest to been use if Wonderland want to take responsibility of they management and actions.
I think you are misunderstanding the intend of this proposal. It is not for Larry to take over, but rather to have people vote on the intend of rebooting Wonderland.
Everything is not fleshed out because the point is to involve to community to get the feedback of people like you to come up with a structure that works and that isn’t bogged down.
This is also why this is not a “takeover” proposal like so many others, but rather a “rebuilding” proposal. Once a better governance structure is establish, we can find people who have experience managing money and have the community vote on the best option.
Sure it will take longer this way, then if we were to just hand out 700mil to a team, but I think it would be for the best.
Thanks for taking the time to review our proposal and for your input. Few comments:
1/ your statement “fund is too big to have many managers and it’s impact on the fees” —> example: 2% charged on 100 managed by one manager or 2% charged on 10 tickets of 10 managed by 10 managers is the same.
More managers has many benefits:
limited keyman risk, ie the boat does not sink because of one guy (like what s happening now).
diversification of the sources of performance. There is NOT one profitable strategy in the crypto space but many (yield farming, VC, basis trades, long/short coins, event driven etc). We want to capture all the source of performance to be the best performer dao and we want to onboard the best manager on each strategy.
2/ Oversight committee = internal audit is an erroneous way to look at governance. The role of the oversight committee as explained in our proposal is not limited to controlling events after they occur or controlling compliance with current rules (what internal audit does).
3/ to avoid any misunderstanding here 1 BUSD treasury or circa 700 MusD today is HUGE (not a small fund as you say) from all perspectives (the size of the crypto space, the ability to move markets, the reputational risk if things go bad (I can guarantee you that regulators will not let this mess be buried even if there is a wind down). Therefore, the overhead we re proposing is the minimum professional risk managers would require for a fund of this size. In fact, we are far from what would be required in tradfi while we re unregulated.
Plz feel free to propose any constructive ideas, we will take them into account.
Thanks for taking the time to review our proposal and for your input. Few comments:
1/ your statement “fund is too big to have many managers and it’s impact on the fees” —> example: 2% charged on 100 managed by one manager or 2% charged on 10 tickets of 10 managed by 10 managers is the same.
More managers has many benefits:
limited keyman risk, ie the boat does not sink because of one guy (like what s happening now).
diversification of the sources of performance. There is NOT one profitable strategy in the crypto space but many (yield farming, VC, basis trades, long/short coins, event driven etc). We want to capture all the source of performance to be the best performer dao and we want to onboard the best manager on each strategy.
*******This is not how you manage a fund. You manage a fund by developing the key outlines of what the fund is and how it will invest the assets raised. You also develop key objectives and overall goals of the fund and implement a plan of action to execute. All VC, private debt and equity funds don’t manager their fund like this. You have people in place that do key parts and if they get let go someone else will oversee that part until you hire someone else that poisiton. You don’t going building out three different departments that do the same thing and develop more overall cost to the fund. I also feel that this is being said because the current ways Wonderland has been hander. I think it’s fair to say there’s a lot that we as Time holders don’t know, but it’s obvious that the current way Wonderland is operating its lacking processes, procedures, and over all organization. *******
2/ Oversight committee = internal audit is an erroneous way to look at governance. The role of the oversight committee as explained in our proposal is not limited to controlling events after they occur or controlling compliance with current rules (what internal audit does).
******* Call it what you like the point is there needs to be independent individuals that report to the Board. The key objective is to identify the risks and ensure that they are mitigated by the company. We would also need external auditors to audit the financials and make them available to the public.*******
3/ to avoid any misunderstanding here 1 BUSD treasury or circa 700 MusD today is HUGE (not a small fund as you say) from all perspectives (the size of the crypto space, the ability to move markets, the reputational risk of things go bad (I can guarantee you that regulators will not let this mess be buried even if there is a wind down). Therefore, the overhead we re proposing is the minimum professional risk managers would require for size amount of managed money. In fact, we are far from what would be required in tradfi while we re unregulated.
*This may be big for a start up DAO but in the space of SPAC, VC, Private debt and equity it’s not big. How are you basing your opinion on if this is a big or small fund? Just so you understand how I’m formulating my opinion if this is big or small. I’ve been in private equity / family office for over 12 years and have deployed over 1.25 billion in funds over that time in to companies.
Plz feel free to propose any constructive ideas, we will take them into account.
If the whales wants to leave, ok, sell their wmemo. The treasury will not give whales the backing price, because the protocol has been attacked. Without the treasury, the frogs have no capital, and governance power are meaningless. Protecting the treasury from being eaten by whales is fundamental to continuing wonderland.
That BSGG snapshot was taken weeks ago, supposedly. If so, it should be adhered to as originally promised. KEEP your original word. Don’t twist and turn as is convenient. Restore some faith this way. It’s a path to bringing the people back.
Could you please clarify this phrase “Firstly, those who no longer wish to participate in the DAO may redeem any wMEMO purchased prior to Jan 29, 2022, 6:00AM UTC for treasury equivalent MIM at the backing price.”
Does that mean anyone who has purchased (irrespectively of whether they sold their tokens or were liquidated) can redeem? Or is it anyone who purchased and still holds the wMEMO tokens?
Hey i answered in discord as well, but will post the same here for those reading along:
Hey, of course. This sentence means those who currently hold wMemo may redeem that wMemo if it was in their wallet before that snapshot.
Example 1: you had 1 wmemo before 29 Jan and bought another 1 wmemo after 29 jan, you may redeem 1 wmemo (the first one).
Example 2: you had 1 wmemo before 29 jan, but sold it on 30 jan, you cannot redeem.
Example 3: you bought 1 wmemo on 30 Jan, you cannot redeem.
Some context: we do not want to lock anyone into Wonderland 2.0 who does not want to be there. This is a community effort, and those who want to continue should want to be part of the community.
We are currently revising this based on ongoing developments, such as the implementation of WIP#4 and AIP#7.
Regardless of these developments our strategy remains, create as much value as we can for our community and offer a reasonable way out for those that want to leave.
Does answer your question?
Side note: Gladly, if you have ideas you’d like to see become reality in Wonderland 2.0, let us know!
I think we should clarify, we’re not suggesting a takeover. This is a framework for the community to move forward with transparency and accountability.
If we believe in @daniele vision, then he should be voted into the role of Chief Strategy Officer and continue to give vision. But he shouldn’t need to be CSO, CFO, CMO and a builder. No one should. It’s too much responsibility and workload for just a few people.
Did we agree already to reimburse our initial investment?
All those votes are ill conceived
I am happy to quit with my initial 13.5 ETH and happy to invest somewhere else. Thanks
not interested in all this comedy. Here there is too much personal emotions and very few facts
