Wonderland Next Steps

[TheSkyHopper]

Hi All!

Dani has decided to step down from a leadership role in Wonderland and thus leaves Wonderland to be governed by the community as of Sep 4th. I believe that today (Sep 5th) will be an AMA with some questions answered but given the time zone difference I will not be able to attend. So I’ll jot down some notes here as we look to navigate this DAO through not only material internal changes, but also changing macro conditions.

Treasury Management - Liquid Portion:

I believe the DAO should look to optimize allocations of capital where there are easy wins.

1. Buybacks
2. Deployment of more capital into appropriate yield farms
3. Some extension of risk into other lending protocols

Treasury Management - Illiquid Portion

1. Maintaining: we should assign the Mod Team at first to get in touch with our VC investment targets - and re-establish relationships (or strengthen them).

2. In the future, we can reach out to other projects and examine if they have certain needs for capital and a community backing.

Risk and Conflict of Interest Control:
We need to make sure that risk management and conflicts of interests are always in check on behalf of Wonderland Holder-Users. In retrospect, without a separated risk diligence function has led to major problems in the first place including:

Acquisition, holding, and voting patterns for Convex
Positioning on Terra USD

Here, I think on top of WIP15 allotment of Treasury Operators, Advisors, and a Treasury Counsel; there needs to be a vested interested person to offer an analysis of risk of certain capital allocations and the ability to (if needed) unilateral power to block an allocation. This is similar to create a “balance of power” with this particular seat to be a risk protection mechanism. (perhaps if blocked, a member can raise this particular topic to a DAO vote). I plan on writing another Dao Discussion on this matter very soon.

Legal Counsel

I think it would be prudent to officially register the DAO as a foundation or a corporate entity affiliate. This would allow the DAO to be able to interact with more service providers in an official manner (such as OTC trading). Such registrations will also clarify the legal classification of wMEMO, and set boundries that DAO should act to say within the bounds of such clarified legal classification. If/as we move to a legally “incorporate” or “mutualized” entity, then this can open up significant doors for the DAO and community to expand its offerings to the members.

A compliance consultant or office should be established, to allow for compliance for messaging from the DAO on public outlets such as social media etc. Team members should also be bound within guidelines for appropriate behaviour as well.

Looking forward:
These allow for a creation of a safety net to operate that we have a base confidence on -
Risk and Conflict of Interest Management
Marketing Guidelines of Engagement
Legal Entity Clarity

With these kinds of rather unprecedented grounds of a base for a DAO, I see on these things alone the attractiveness of users and end joint venture partners wanting to work with us.

Other comments:
To note, due to community upheaval since SifuGate, WIP4, 5, 7; WIP 8, 14, and 15 may have been written with the mind that Dani’s continued involvement in WL as holding the multi-sig. This will change and these WIPs should be re-examined to make sure that there is a solid foundation to allow for a post Dani community governance and to protect the community as much as possible from future issues or bad actors.

Any questions / comments / criticism invited!

[jclemons]

The mod team has already been given contact info and is supposedly in touch with both seed partners and has tried to get info from CTA and was supposed to try again as CTA wasn’t very forthcoming with real info on first inquiry.

[Deal]

I agree strongly that risk management is important, and I can see the need to separate the role of risk management from that of TO/TA to a certain extent. Given that compensation is paid based to an extent on performance, and there are hurdles involved for the current TA we don’t want to expose the DAO to undue risk in search of lofty returns. I’m wondering if perhaps setting specific guardrails, as we’ve discussed earlier might help and these could only be overriden either by DAO approval (perhaps too slow?) or by a risk manager. For instance, perhaps keeping allocations limited to 10% per protocol/unique SC risk. So capping exposure to GMX, stargate, etc. unless approved by DAO. We can look at other risk metrics here as well, but this is just an example. Also to be addressed are conflicts of interest as you’ve stated, ethical dilemmas, etc.

[TheSkyHopper]

I can try to get a contact at CTA through a different route.

[jclemons]

Can you provide some specifics to these points?

2. Deployment of more capital into appropriate yield farms
3. Some extension of risk into other lending protocols

[TheSkyHopper]

We can look at some specific examples:

2. This turns out to be a lot less interesting to be honest currently. For example some risk into the Dola-3crv (though this is a bit of chasing returns).

3. This gets a bit more interesting to deploy some capital into uncollateralized lending to trading firms via Clearpool and Truefi.

Borrowers in the USDC and USDT pools are surviving top names generally - and something we can work with. (Truefi specifically, I have a vested interest there however).

I am sure/hopeful, TOs will also have some ideas as well.

[MattMacGyver]

Very supportive of all of this. I’ve been looking through legal frameworks available to us for incorporating and I’m not quite sure which direction is best, but I know it’s an especially important aspect to get worked out asap.

As much as I want to steer clear of US regulatory overzealousness, the few states that have frameworks in place for DAOs may be our best options. I’m leaning toward a Foundation + DAO LLC combo approach, as outlined in this article. This would separate the Treasury from the Protocol and establishing two separate entities. One entity oversees the treasury while the other employs the team and interacts with outside organizations. This approach can maintain privacy for holders, limit liability for members, and provide needed access to real world interaction with legal entities.