[WIP #32] - Wonderland DAO Amendment

[WIP #32] - Wonderland DAO Amendment


The scope of this proposal is to turn Wonderland into an organization that serves its token holders. This will be done by improving security, ensuring stability, and allowing flexibility, by creating a team of officers empowered to handle day-to-day operations with less friction.

The primary things this proposal does are:

  • Streamline DAO governance processes to be more efficient.
  • Empowers elected officers to make decisions within their departments.
  • Establishes the Wonderland management budget.


This proposal takes into consideration legal advice and maintains stability and security. This proposal seeks to reduce governance inefficiencies that cost holders both in opportunities and profits. It will reduce attack vectors on governance that may occur, and empower an elected team to make decisions with reduced friction. It assures flexibility and responsiveness in a space where these traits are paramount.

Link to previous discussion

[DAO Discussion] Wonderland DAO Amendment
[RFC] Wonderland DAO Amendment



  • Yes, Implement the new model
  • No, make no change


The purpose of this proposal is not to abolish everything the DAO has created over the past year. In fact, the opposite is true. It is the result of a deep desire to protect what Wonderland has achieved and created that led to the formulation of this proposal.

Without question, our current system is flawed. Governance and the framework are composed of a number of small pieces that do not fit together and are, at a minimum, slow in response.

As there is much work to be done and the security and procedure of our existing governance and investment systems are compromised, Wonderland cannot afford to pause the DAO this way and engage in months-long discussions to address every miniscule detail. Instead, we can proceed with what is proposed here, being more knowledgeable this time around, and build on this revised structure.

Pointing out and discussing security flaws that may imminently cause a governance attack without addressing them in the same proposal is unwise. The elected team would be remiss if we delayed the protocol’s process as a precaution until the DAO reaches an agreement on all aspects of its management.

In addition to the existing team, the DAO is presented with the possibility to add a significant boost of insight and advice to ensure the protocol’s success by including one of Wonderland’s founders, Sifu, who has extensive experience with TradeFi, DeFi, hedge funds and professional contracts. Acquiring a team member with his advanced level of expertise is essential in ensuring the ongoing success of Wonderland.

High Level Overview

The following proposal was crafted after a series of in-depth discussions with legal firms around the world, which led to the realization that we have failed our holders by losing focus on the main objective of the protocol: profits for holders.

As a result of Wonderland’s abstract management, there is a high risk of malicious actors carrying out governance attacks in an effort to totalize the system. Protocol stability is negatively impacted directly by this, since these actors may accumulate voting power for a brief period of time and promote their own agendas in specific aspects of Wonderland’s day-to-day operations.

Moreover, Wonderland has been subjected to long, frequent, and inefficient governance procedures, which are susceptible to manipulation. Though the team has always focused on the community and how to serve it better, unintentionally it has resulted in a system that focuses and abides by the loudest people, not the clear majority of silent “stake and chill” token holders. A long and time-consuming governance system, that promotes mob participation rather than a power by shares or delegation in Wonderland, which is host to constant conflict and disagreement between people who, estimated on votes, collectively hold a very small percentage of the shares.

Furthermore, our Treasury cannot respond quickly to the fast changing market conditions, which is essential in this industry, thereby damaging its performance and putting investor value at risk. Some examples from the last quarter illustrate how Treasury delays lead to big financial losses.

Example I

UwU Lend, which was one of the most controversial proposals and had to be voted on three times, resulting in Wonderland losing an average of ~$4,000 per day for every day the proposal was delayed. The Treasury Council decided to lock UwU on 8th of November and the final approval arrived on 8th of December resulting in an approximate amount of $120,000 in damages. This directly affects the liquid backing as the yield is considered liquid for the redemption price. Aside from the daily damages, the exposure of this proposal was significant and led to a certain amount of frontrunning. The original proposal for the lock-in UwU LP was drafted with Wonderland at the time looking at around 300% APY returns on investment. However, once the TMP actually passed, a month later, Wonderland was looking at around 150% APY return on investment prior to the lock.

Example II

As part of Interport seed phase presale investment, Wonderland intended to invest $1,500,000 for 7,500,000 ITP at $0.2 per token. Upon approval of the proposal, Interport’s presale had already concluded and the price had changed to $0.3 per token. Ultimately, Wonderland acquired 5,000,000 ITP, resulting in an overall loss of 2,500,000 ITP, or $2,800,000 at the current valuation.

Example III

The Swapfish investment was among the TOs’ alpha findings. However, yields dropped by over 75% during the delay. Both the alpha and Wonderland’s intention to join were announced to anyone interested. This gave to others several days of yield that should have benefitted Wonderland’s holders.

Several other positions were canceled or modified as the TMP caused frontrunning and valuable time was lost. Some strategies were never proposed, as they cannot efficiently be implemented with these processes.

Wonderland’s Treasury has been threatened by lengthy procedures and frontrunning opportunities that the protocol provides by informing the public space in advance of Wonderland’s investments. This tactic would be considered outrageous and unacceptable by any experienced investor. It is common for frontrunners to pay for access to such information, whereas Wonderland leaks it for free via the TMP system, confusing strategic information censorship with transparency.

It is prudent to establish a successful corporate management structure for Wonderland in order to ensure long-term stability, security, and flexibility. It will help the protocol to reach its full potential and maximize profit for holders. Corporate management structures have been developed through decades of experience and billions of dollars of investment, and have been found to be an optimal structure by regulatory agencies and think tanks around the world.

For the protocol to be successful, secure, and stable, it is essential to have a strong leadership team with decision-making authority. In the midst of a bear market where opportunities are limited, now is the time to take action and evolve to prevent further losses caused by our systematically flawed structure and establish a proven working system to achieve the wants of the vast majority: security, efficiency, stability, performance, and profit.

Fortunately, this year, a number of individuals from the community emerged to lead the internal process and maintain the protocol’s integrity and vision.

It is imperative to give the team the opportunity to continue with greater efficiency what they have been doing for the past year, despite their limited access. A better management system is one that aligns with real-world trends and lessons learned, rather than reinventing the wheel. The DAO should be responsible for setting the general direction of the organization, while management should be responsible for its day-to-day operations.

Low Level Details

A six-department structure was designed based on Wonderland’s current operations to avoid the danger of testing an unfamiliar system which could lead to negative results.

  • Communication
  • Compliance
  • Finance
  • Operations
  • Technology
  • Visionary

Departments Overview

Communication Department


The voice of Wonderland. Communications, social media, monthly Medium articles and community platforms are the scope of this department and serves as a meeting point between the various departments and the community at large.

Compliance Department


The Compliance Department should provide advice and assistance to all managerial posts with regard to compliance with all relevant laws, regulation, and DAO rules.

Finance Department


Oversee all Treasury-related activities. Responsible for the preparation of quarterly performance reports for the holders, oversight of the Treasury operations and its budget, community proposals, risk management, and approval of strategies.

Operations Department


Ensure that the information is accurate, the structure is appropriate, the internal organization is effective, and that legal advice is followed in cooperation with the Compliance Department. In addition to ensuring Wonderland’s internal operations are efficient, the Operations Department will provide the rest of the departments with solutions to increase day-to-day efficiency. The Operations Department also serves as the Protocol’s information bank.

Technology Department


Ensure that the protocol’s technical components meet industry standards. Assurance that all technical operations are functional and properly managed. Ensure that technological resources are geared towards technological advancement and all technical improvements and suggestions are implemented in a timely manner.

Visionary Department


Advise all departments in order to ensure that the vision for the Protocol’s growth is implemented and provide knowledge and guidance on delicate decisions. Analyzing and providing insight into the potential risks associated with the protocol’s financial investments to help avoid making decisions that might have unintended consequences. Whenever necessary, assisting with the negotiations with third party protocols.

Departments Details

The DAO serves as the organization’s board of directors and elects officers to handle all aspects of the organization’s management. Token holders are provided with close communication daily through Wonderland’s social platforms and discord channels, or they can opt to follow the quarterly treasury summary and market outlook and regular news articles instead. Establishing this structure will be beneficial for future restrictions and regulations as it closely resembles existing real-world corporate structures.

In order for the Protocol to fulfill its strategic mission, the Team is responsible to collectively establish and publish the operational system that demonstrates how specific activities will be handled. In order to ensure frictionless workflows, secure procedures, and adhere to legal advice to prepare for any upcoming regulations, the team will implement an internal system of operations that is as close to actual fund guidelines as possible. The revised management structure explicitly sets all internal rules.

Executive Decisions

The Officers will be responsible for managing the day to day operations of the protocol. Formerly voted WIPs shall be considered as operational guidelines.

Removal of an Officer

By the Team

Any team member may propose the removal of another team member by internal vote with a valid reason. Majority vote is required.

By the DAO

A No-Confidence Vote (NCV) can be proposed by a DAO member as a DAO Discussion [DD], with solid reasoning, to replace any member of the team. The DAO may initiate the forum-based removal process as follows: The NCV must be posted and remain open in the Wonderland Forum for three days before voting. At the conclusion of the discussion period, a four-day Snapshot vote will be conducted requiring 75% of voters in agreement on the final decision of removing the team member. In order to prevent exploitation of the system, team members are granted immunity for three months after their election as well as two weeks of immunity after an unsuccessful NCV. During this time, only an unanimous vote of the team can remove another member.

Addition of an Officer

In the event of a team member being ousted, unable to fulfill the duties of the position for a prolonged period of time, or resigning prior to official elections, the team will vote for an interim replacement and an open letter will be posted in the forum. The team holds the responsibility to conduct due diligence for each application and to approve the candidacy.

Management Budget

In accordance with industry standards, legal advice, and community feedback, a 2&10 system is suggested. The management fee will be 2% per year, and the performance fee is 10% per year of profits only, with a high watermark, defined as the price difference of wMEMO between the conclusion of each quarter and the highest liquid redemption price of wMEMO since the passing of this proposal. This budget is dedicated to cover all operational costs for running the organization.

Operational costs include but are not limited to team member salaries, legal expenses, marketing, payments for required personnel within departments, technological maintenance, enhancements and security, and any other expenses required for protocol management. An expense report will be published on a quarterly basis to provide transparency on how the management fee has been utilized.

Term of Office

As per community suggestion, and Officers’ agreement, the members of the management team will remain in their positions until they resign, the team votes them out, or the DAO replaces them via an NCV.

Governance Forum

A new subcategory, Wonderland Management Proposal (WMP) will be created, replacing the RFC and WIP sections. The DAO Discussion section (DD) may be used by any member of the DAO who wishes to post an official proposal for review by the management team. The management team as whole or any member of the management separately can edit, refine, and promote the proposal to WMP, if the proposal is deemed as beneficial for the DAO and enough participation is reached. The management team may use a direct WMP to obtain DAO approval for potentially contentious or highly important decisions. It should be noted, however, that while this will be the case for any major changes, this option is not mandatory for management and operational changes. The time frame for the discussion phase for each WMP prior to posting a Snapshot vote will be determined dynamically by the management team based on the state of emergency, the complexity, and the feedback received.


The elected Officers will constitute the Wonderland Management Team if passed. All responsibilities and authorities for the management of the protocol will be transferred to them. It is expected that decisions made using the old governance system will be followed, less strictly, at the discretion of the management team in order to ensure a rapid improvement in the protocol’s operations until revised amendments are voted through via WMP.

The goal is to implement a system that is as close to real fund guidelines as possible. This will ensure a frictionless workflow and a fast but efficient decision-making process. Implementing a proven system will not only enhance the team’s ability to comply with regulatory requirements, but will allow them to formulate legally and statutorily acceptable guidelines as well.


Hello. I can see that the budget of each area is not explained yet. I assume that each of you has had experience managing companies. Each area or department has a fixed budget which can be modified as required. Do we really not have dimensioned the fixed expenses for each department?

For example:

2% management fee = 2MM.

  • 20% of this budget will be allocated to the technology department - 400k.
  • 25% of this 20% will go (as a fixed amount) to the salary of the Officer (Catalyst) - 100k.
  • Next 5% will go to freelancers for the web/app maintenance - 20K.
  • 5% for server maintenance - 20k.
  • 20% will go to the developer team (5 in total, paid in equal parts) - 80k
  • 45% for variable costs - 180k

This is a simple example, but I think you get the idea. If you have submitted this proposal, you should have sized up the fixed costs and have an idea of ​​the variable costs. If a larger budget is needed, it will have to be justified and explained in the report you mention.

We don’t know how much $$$ will go to each department? We don’t know how much will go to each officer?

I don’t have a lot of voting power, but it’s definitely a NO until these things are explained. I see that several people have asked the same thing and the detail is still missing.



I don’t see a problem with this since the budget size is defined, the allocation is fluid, and the budgets will be included in Treasury reports. Treasury funds moving untracked would be a problem for me, I am not bothered by the lack of a pre-allocated speculative budget which will change dynamically. When the time comes, I’d like to see the actual reports showing how the budget was allocated.

I will be judgmental if the expense fails to deliver growth. I am confident that providing the required flexibility we will be mooning soon. I support this proposal.


I agree with your comment, but I would suggest going into even more detail. For example, what would variable costs (180k) cover?

Obviously it’s hard to budget for something that isn’t entirely mapped yet. As an alternative, would it be easier/more efficient to build out these budget areas one at a time, and allocate funds for them in steps?


Did we just ignore all the comments in the RFC and moved the proposal to WIP? This proposal is starting to look like a soft rug NGL


No FUD, but this is what it seems like. Why are we not doing 1%/10%? There’s simply no justification in the proposal for why a 2% management fee is required nor explanation for how it will be spent. There’s just no way this change can be part of this proposal without a detailed account of the newly proposed budget.

I suggest we either leave the budget part out of this proposal or we add a detailed account of how the money will be spent and justify why we need 2% instead of 1%. Otherwise, this certainly looks like a soft rug.


Going to repeat some of the things I’ve said in Discord here because I want it on record on this WIP: Catalyst is refusing to respond to questions about the budget because he doesn’t agree with them and doesn’t think they’re necessary before a vote. A vote that he knows is rigged from the start because he’s included Sifu as a team member here, so he knows it will pass no matter what.

Hell, I guess you could say I’m just envious that I’m not on a team that has a $3M budget that they can spend any way they want without any oversight, negative repercussions or accountability.

If his purpose here isn’t to ignite a crazy amount of FUD, I’m not sure what it is. Without providing any more clarity whatsoever, this is basically the definition of a soft rug. Plain and simple.


I’m actually really sad, because it would so easy just to address the questions. One simple question is being omitted:

Will the salary of each officer change? If yes, how much?

If it is undecided, why haven’t this been discussed prior to putting forward the proposal.

If only counting prior officer salaries (while being generous), this was accomplished with a budget of roughly half a million a year. To speak to your previous argument about counting fees at 1% (full backing), this would free up 1.4 million a year, with 900k to spare after keeping the current salary structure and assuming no upside.


You are free to disagreeing with the proposal or the proposed management fee and point out any issues you would like.

However, claims of rug will not be tolerated. The team has full intention to keep working on the project and improve Wonderland regardless of this proposal passing or not.

Consider this an official warning @Stevoman and @Kingmaker9999

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I wanna point out that I merely stated that the proposal is starting to look like a soft rug. No claims of actual rug or intent. Having it look that way is a bad image for WL - for all my opinion is worth.

I can only assume that the reason nobody wants to speak up on expected salary is because they are afraid of a potential backlash? I’m almost 100% certain anyone involved already have an idea of what their expected salary is. Why is it such a big issue to say this out loud? It will be visible on chain soon anyway.


Agree. If we hire people, we need to agree on a salary with each individual.
This proposal in this form is incomplete.


That’s just BS. It looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, but you can’t infer that it might be a duck because we’re warning you that we don’t want it being called a duck.

That’s just using your authority here to prevent people from speaking. It’s not FUD if specific reasons are given and those reasons are justifiable/provable. The original poster has not provided any evidence or justification for why this amount of money is actually needed to run the protocol. Without that justification, what would you call it? What do you think that looks like to the outside world that doesn’t have the context that the internal team has that has been part of the ‘internal discussion’ that supposedly happened to come up with this figure? Better yet, if some bad actor with lots of voting power wanted to “legally” abide by the rules of the DAO and take treasury money by passing through a vote (like we’ve seen with some other DAOs), how do you think they would do it? Historically speaking, they shove a vote down everyone’s throats that they know they have the ability to pass and nobody can stop them.

Once again, I’m not saying this is a rug. Nor is Kingmaker. But if a “rug” were to “legally” happen according to the rules of the DAO, it would mimic what is going on here.

I’m sure you’d be quite skeptical if someone asked for 90% of the treasury as a management fee and didn’t provide proper reasoning for how they got there. But because it’s “only 2%”, you’re okay with information not being provided. All I’m asking is for the original poster to show how they came to this conclusion and justify it to the DAO who needs to vote on it. How could the DAO ever make a proper decision about whether this is the actual amount of money needed if they are not given the information as to “why” it’s needed? Do you want us to just guess and trust you blindly? Pretend you’re not part of the team. What does that look like to you?

I trust the the team and don’t believe this is what the team intends. But this is a VERY dangerous precedent to set. Just because we have a trustworthy team right now, doesn’t mean it will always be that way in the future. We need to set a good path for ourselves or risk being the victim of a “highly profitable trading strategy” like I suggested in Discord.

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Snapshot is now live:

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[WIP #32] - Wonderland DAO Amendment was approved with 96.94% of votes in favor.

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