So, in practice, with the WL2.0 proposal, it could be beneficial either way. If the whales are incentivized to cash out, then more governance is awarded to the frogs. For the health of the protocol, governance > funds.
But… on the other hand, the tokenomics of 2.0 would basically lock them in for a few months unless they want to hand over 50% of their investment to the treasury.
It’s mostly just a question of, “Do the frogs want more governance power or treasury power?”
If Harry wants to contribute to the proposal then he’s welcome to. We want something we can get the community behind. We can’t keep relying on billionaires and @daniele to bail us out.
My only Comment on this is. It’s been proven that the masses will not make the correct long term decisions. If all decisions are put to a vote of the DAO we will constantly make very poor mediocre decisions. I think we can vote on a Board of Directors what have the ability to fire CEO CFO Etc. But ultimately you need to empower the front line managers and let them do what they were hired to do.
Thank you. There is more information in the medium detailed proposal linked at the bottom. Phase 2 is the most critical. We would need a team working on development of new tokenomics, transition community management and establish regular voting protocols. It’s a lot of change to communicate all at once, which was why we proposed a full time marketing team.
In terms of legality, I’m curious as to what issues you could see coming up? Ideally the investment team will not be US-based but that’s up to the DAO to determine based on risk.
How do we find these directors?
This can be very easy. We vote in a management team, they draft a proposal and we vote on it. Proposal for a properly staffed Wonderland team w/ background checks
Why would we pay bad actors a premium to leave? Let them dump the price against themselves if they want out. At least their shares would transfer and the treasury would stay in tact.
Sounds great but how concerned are you that the treasury will be dissolved in 5 days after the WIP#4 proposal was blocked?
Functionally, the way we’ve designed the tokenomics, incentivizing bad actors to leave opens up more governance token share for smaller holders. This helps to distribute the voting power more evenly at the very beginning and strengthen the protocol governance.
On the other hand, not incentivizing those actors to leave, essentially would mean they’re getting locked into the vesting schedule of the new gMEMO and wSHARE system, so unless they really hate 75% of their money, they won’t be dumping.
It’s not shutting down…
danielesesta — Today at 12:15 PM
Good morning Frogs,
The vote has been concluded and we hear you. The individual frogs combined took the vote back from the whales, deciding to continue Wonderland. We understand communication has been sporadic, confusing, and imprecise. There will be a period of calm over the next few days where we will listen to you, compile suggestions, and determine the best path forward. Improving communication and deciding a clear direction with this powerful community of frogs is the #1 priority.
I will be available in this server for the next 3-5 days to hear your feelings, ideas, and suggestions so we can move forward together as a community and a DAO to make everyone whole, as some people do seem like they would like to close or redeem their treasury capital. I am very proud of what the community has accomplished and am very excited for what can be done in the future. You have decided, and this isn’t over. @everyone 
This is good news imo. It means this proposal could be implemented and the ship stabilized…
Treasury management has been a hot topic recently. We believe a decentralised treasury management model is the solution to concerns that have been raised. What does that look like?
We’ll no longer have a single treasury manager, instead we’ll have an oversight committee, a financial officer and a whole bunch of small investment managers.
***** The fund is stronger with the money together not divided up. When you designate investment managers in this scenario you’re diluting the ROI to the Wonderland holders because you’re just increasing the overall overhead with fees and making the overall process more bogged down with more cooks in the kitchen. Not only that you’re putting the trust of our money is someone’s hands that may or may not have a clue on what they are doing. This isn’t that big of a fund where you need all these people. If you had a team of 10 you’d be fine. *********
******** I think what you mean is head of internal audit which would be just one person and they would report to the Board and only the Board. You don’t call this an oversight committee. ***********
********* Again way too many cooks in the kitchen. You don’t need to employee all these people. The whole point of the senior leadership is to oversee these items. ***********
********Your plan is weak at best. It doesn’t develop key outlines on what the structure would look like, who would be doing the external audit, if we would have an external audit, would it be made public and how us follow frogs will be able to have any transparency in this process outside of becoming one of these key people you outlined. *********
Also it cleanly shows that you’ve never managed money before which scares the hell out of me.
The proposal start bad…
Firstly, those who no longer wish to participate in the DAO may redeem any wMEMO purchased prior to Jan 29, 2022, 6:00AM UTC for treasury equivalent MIM at the backing price. Obviously, this will still be a loss for most people.
It’s no taking responsibility for the bad communication, decision and behavior that left us in the situation that we are now.
First of all have to be restored the trust. to accomplish those at least should be fullfed the promised that was made like:
BSGG Airdrop announcement on twitter and discord like a month ago by Sifu
Refund announcement on twitter by Daniele and in Discord by Sifu for the two black days liquidation below backing price (they said, they will pay with their own pockets, no treasury involve).
Daniele said that he will burn some personal wMEMO. Actually was a discussion here inside the forum and a poll and burn wMEMO wins.
Give a rage quit option at backing pierce per wMEMO.
Accomplishing these promises made by the owner and the CFO of Wonderland, you remove the fud, the hatred and open a path to a new bright future.
Its very important the snapshot that will be used, I personally believe that the BSGG Airdrop announcement is the fairest to been use if Wonderland want to take responsibility of they management and actions.
I think you are misunderstanding the intend of this proposal. It is not for Larry to take over, but rather to have people vote on the intend of rebooting Wonderland.
Everything is not fleshed out because the point is to involve to community to get the feedback of people like you to come up with a structure that works and that isn’t bogged down.
This is also why this is not a “takeover” proposal like so many others, but rather a “rebuilding” proposal. Once a better governance structure is establish, we can find people who have experience managing money and have the community vote on the best option.
Sure it will take longer this way, then if we were to just hand out 700mil to a team, but I think it would be for the best.
Who would over see the funds until we find someone?
Thanks for taking the time to review our proposal and for your input. Few comments:
1/ your statement “fund is too big to have many managers and it’s impact on the fees” —> example: 2% charged on 100 managed by one manager or 2% charged on 10 tickets of 10 managed by 10 managers is the same.
More managers has many benefits:
2/ Oversight committee = internal audit is an erroneous way to look at governance. The role of the oversight committee as explained in our proposal is not limited to controlling events after they occur or controlling compliance with current rules (what internal audit does).
3/ to avoid any misunderstanding here 1 BUSD treasury or circa 700 MusD today is HUGE (not a small fund as you say) from all perspectives (the size of the crypto space, the ability to move markets, the reputational risk if things go bad (I can guarantee you that regulators will not let this mess be buried even if there is a wind down). Therefore, the overhead we re proposing is the minimum professional risk managers would require for a fund of this size. In fact, we are far from what would be required in tradfi while we re unregulated.
Plz feel free to propose any constructive ideas, we will take them into account.
Thanks for taking the time to review our proposal and for your input. Few comments:
1/ your statement “fund is too big to have many managers and it’s impact on the fees” —> example: 2% charged on 100 managed by one manager or 2% charged on 10 tickets of 10 managed by 10 managers is the same.
More managers has many benefits:
*******This is not how you manage a fund. You manage a fund by developing the key outlines of what the fund is and how it will invest the assets raised. You also develop key objectives and overall goals of the fund and implement a plan of action to execute. All VC, private debt and equity funds don’t manager their fund like this. You have people in place that do key parts and if they get let go someone else will oversee that part until you hire someone else that poisiton. You don’t going building out three different departments that do the same thing and develop more overall cost to the fund. I also feel that this is being said because the current ways Wonderland has been hander. I think it’s fair to say there’s a lot that we as Time holders don’t know, but it’s obvious that the current way Wonderland is operating its lacking processes, procedures, and over all organization. *******
2/ Oversight committee = internal audit is an erroneous way to look at governance. The role of the oversight committee as explained in our proposal is not limited to controlling events after they occur or controlling compliance with current rules (what internal audit does).
******* Call it what you like the point is there needs to be independent individuals that report to the Board. The key objective is to identify the risks and ensure that they are mitigated by the company. We would also need external auditors to audit the financials and make them available to the public.*******
3/ to avoid any misunderstanding here 1 BUSD treasury or circa 700 MusD today is HUGE (not a small fund as you say) from all perspectives (the size of the crypto space, the ability to move markets, the reputational risk of things go bad (I can guarantee you that regulators will not let this mess be buried even if there is a wind down). Therefore, the overhead we re proposing is the minimum professional risk managers would require for size amount of managed money. In fact, we are far from what would be required in tradfi while we re unregulated.
*This may be big for a start up DAO but in the space of SPAC, VC, Private debt and equity it’s not big. How are you basing your opinion on if this is a big or small fund? Just so you understand how I’m formulating my opinion if this is big or small. I’ve been in private equity / family office for over 12 years and have deployed over 1.25 billion in funds over that time in to companies.
Plz feel free to propose any constructive ideas, we will take them into account.
Over 100 frogs have shared their questions, ideas and suggestion for Wonderland 2.0. We answered, clarified and incorporated all of them!
If you’d like to see what we did with your suggestion, see: Notion.so in case you disagree let us know ofc!
I haven’t removed my funds because I want to cut my loses with wonderland 2.0
Looks very familiar to me!!! I made this proposal a few days ago and the only thing I would change is Dani not being included!
